stating that when a corporation “ ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,’ it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State”
How later courts described this case
- stating that when a corporation “ ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,’ it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State”
- holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident auto distributor whose only connection to the forum resulted from a customer's decision to drive there failed to provide the defendant with "clear notice that it [would be] subject to suit" in the forum state and thus an opportunity to "alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation" there
- holding that personal jurisdiction may be present where a *1143 corporation delivers its product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the product will be purchased by consumers in the forum state and rejecting jurisdiction based on the consumer's unilateral movement of the product into the forum state even if the movement is foreseeable
- stating that, if the sale of a product “arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Apollo Technologies Corp. v. Centrosphere Industrial Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1157 (1992)
444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, does not control this case and is distinguishable on its facts.
Distinguished by Western Helicopters, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1486 (1989)
444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), was distinguishable because in that case the defendants’ sales activities were aimed only at the northeastern part of the United States, and the presence of one of their cars in the State of Oklahoma was purely fortuitous. 715 F.2d at 1358.
Distinguished by Jeffrey Wines and Brett Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Manufacturing, Inc., 846 F.2d 40 (1988)
444 U.S. 286,100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), is inapplicable under the facts of this case because Lake Havasu did not “serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product,” in states other than Arizona and California.
Distinguished by DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp., 67 N.C. App. 640 (1984)
444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1980), relied upon by defendant, is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
I confess that I am somewhat puzzled why the plaintiffs in this litigation are so insistent that the regional distributor and the retail dealer, the petitioners here, who handled the ill-fated Audi automobile involved in this litigation, be named defendants. It would appear that the manufacturer and the *318 importer, whose subjectability to Oklahoma jurisdiction is not challenged before this Court, ought not to be judgment-proof. It may, of course, ultimately amount to a contest between insurance companies that, once begun, is not easily brought to a termination. Having made this much of an observation, I pursue it no further.
For me, a critical factor in the disposition of the litigation is the nature of the instrumentality under consideration. It has been said that we are a nation on wheels. What we are concerned with here is the automobile and its peripatetic character. One need only examine our national network of interstate highways, or make an appearance on one of them, or observe the variety of license plates present not only on those highways but in any metropolitan area, to realize that any automobile is likely to wander far from its place of licen-.sure or from its place of distribution and retail sale. Miles per gallon on the highway (as well as in the city) and mileage per tankful are familiar allegations in manufacturers' advertisements today. To expect that any new automobile will remain in the vicinity of its retail sale — like the 1914 electric car driven by the proverbial “little old lady” — is to blink at reality. The automobile is intended for distance as well as for transportation within a limited area.
It therefore seems to me not unreasonable — and certainly not unconstitutional and beyond the reach of the principles laid down in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), and its progeny — to uphold Oklahoma jurisdiction over this New York distributor and this New York dealer when the accident happened in Oklahoma. I see nothing more unfair for them than for the manufacturer and the importer. All are in the business of providing vehicles that spread out over the highways of our several States. It is not too much to anticipate at the time of distribution and at the time of retail sale that this Audi would be in Oklahoma. Moreover, in assessing “minimum contacts,” foreseeable use in another State seems to me to be little different from foreseeable resale *319 in another State. Yet the Court declares this distinction determinative. Ante, at 297-299.
Mr. Justice Brennan points out in his dissent, ante, at 307, that an automobile dealer derives substantial benefits from States other than its own. The same is true of the regional distributor. Oklahoma does its best to provide safe roads. Its police investigate accidents. It regulates driving within the State. It provides aid to the victim and thereby, it is hoped, lessens damages. Accident reports are prepared and made available. All this contributes to and enhances the business of those engaged professionally in the distribution and sale of automobiles. All this also may benefit defendants in the very lawsuits over which the State asserts jurisdiction.
My position need not now take me beyond the automobile and the professional who does business by way of distributing and retailing automobiles. Cases concerning other instru-mentalities will be dealt with as they arise and in their own contexts.
I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Because the Court reverses that judgment, it will now be about parsing every variant in the myriad of motor vehicle fact situations that present themselves. Some will justify jurisdiction and others will not. All will depend on the “contact” that the Court sees fit to perceive in the individual case.