stating that "parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the State on a minor's right to make important decisions. As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the State on a minor's right to make important decisions. As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor"
- holding that children have special needs in respect to constitutionally protected rights including their “peculiar vulnerability,” “inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner,” as well as “the importance of the parental role in child rearing”
- holding that judicial bypass process for , minors “must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to. provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained”
- ruling that “if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents’ consent to an abortion, it must also provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained” (footnote omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Planned Parenthood Of Southern Arizona v. Barbara Lawall, 307 F.3d 783 (2002)
We reject appellees' contention that this provision alone satisfiesBellotti II's anonymity requirement.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
dissenting.
I was in dissent in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 94-95 (1976), on the issue of the validity of requiring the consent of a parent when an unmarried woman under 18 years of age seeks an abortion. I continue to have the views I expressed there and also agree with much of what Mr. Justice Stevens said in dissent in that *657 case. Id., at 101-105 . I would not, therefore, strike down this Massachusetts law.
But even if a parental consent requirement of the kind involved in Danforth must be deemed invalid, that does not condemn the Massachusetts law, which, when the parents .object, authorizes a judge to permit an abortion if he concludes that an abortion is in the best interests of the child. Going beyond Danforth, the Court now holds it unconstitutional for a State to require that in all cases parents receive notice that their daughter seeks an abortion and, if they object to the abortion, an opportunity to participate in a hearing that will determine whether it is in the “best interests” of the child to undergo the surgery. Until now, I would have thought inconceivable a holding that the United States Constitution forbids even notice to parents when their minor child who seeks surgery objects to such notice and is able to convince a judge that the parents should be denied participation in the decision.
With all due respect, I dissent.