holding that the arrest of an individual for violating a city ordinance later found to be unconstitutional nonetheless complied with the Fourth Amendment, in part because the Court reasoned that the “enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality — with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws” and based on that reasoning, believed that “[a] prudent officer . . . should not have been required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the arrest of an individual for violating a city ordinance later found to be unconstitutional nonetheless complied with the Fourth Amendment, in part because the Court reasoned that the “enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality — with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws” and based on that reasoning, believed that “[a] prudent officer . . . should not have been required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional”
- finding that probable cause to conduct an arrest existed when a presumptively valid ordinance had been violated, even when the ordinance was later deemed to be unconstitutional, and stating that “[p]olice are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional,” noting an exception only when “a law [is] so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws”
- holding that a police officer has probable cause to arrest when the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense”
- holding that “[t]he subsequently determined invalidity of [an] ordinance on vagueness grounds d[id] not undermine the validity of the arrest made for violation of that ordinance, and the evidence discovered in the search . . . should not have been suppressed [under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by McIntosh v. Arkansas Republican Party-Frank White Election Committee, 816 F.2d 409 (1987)
Although as discussed previously, see supra pp. 411-412, DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37, 99 S.Ct. at 2632, could be said to have cast doubt on the standard for probable cause, cases such as Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96 n. 11,100 S.Ct. at 345 n. 11, have removed that doubt.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hernandez v. State, 1980 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1052 (1980)
First, there is no basis for a claim of good faith reliance on established law, and thus the reasoning of DeFiiiippo is inapplicable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, but add a few words about the concern so evident in Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion that today’s decision will allow States and municipalities to circumvent the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. There is some danger, I acknowledge, that the police will use a stop-and-identify ordinance to arrest persons for improper identification; that they will then conduct a search pursuant to the arrest; that if they discover contraband or other evidence of crime, the arrestee will be charged with some other offense; and that if they do not discover contraband or other evidence of crime, the arrestee will be released. In this manner, if the arrest for violation of the stop- *41 and-identify ordinance is not open to challenge, the ordinance itself could perpetually evade constitutional review.
There is no evidence in this case, however, that the Detroit ordinance is being used in such a pretextual manner. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. If a defendant in a proper case showed that the police habitually arrest, but do not prosecute, under a stop-and-identify ordinance, then I think this would suffice to rebut any claim that the police were acting in reasonable, good-faith reliance on the constitutionality of the ordinance. The arrestee could then challenge the validity of the ordinance, and, if the court concluded it was unconstitutional, could have the evidence obtained in the search incident to the arrest suppressed.