stating that not all containers found during a search deserve full Fourth Amendment protection because “some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun ease) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance”
How later courts described this case
- stating that not all containers found during a search deserve full Fourth Amendment protection because “some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun ease) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance”
- stating that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable and can be justified only if it falls within one of the "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
- stating in dicta that "some containers ... by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance."
- excepting from fourth amendment's warrant requirement "those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral Magistrate”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 (1979), abrogated on other grounds, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 , 111 S.Ct. 1982
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 3, 199160 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itCriticized in part by State v. Espinosa-Gamez, 138 Ariz. 415 (1984)
Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case; although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judgment and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by the parties in that case.
Criticized in part by Clapp v. State, 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 5308 (1984)
Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case; although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judgment and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by the parties in that case....
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Luis Ramirez, Leopoldo Alegria-Valencia, Antonio G. Rodriguez, 810 F.2d 1338 (1987)
442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), cited by appellants, is inapposite.
Distinguished by State v. Bennett, 301 Or. 299 (1986)
Thus, Chadwick and Sanders are inapposite.
Distinguished by State v. Vittellone, 187 N.J. Super. 76 (1982)
State v. DeLorenzo, 166 N.J. Super. 483 (App.Div. 1979), like Chadwick and Sanders, is distinguishable factually.
Distinguished by State v. Bourgeois, 388 So. 2d 359 (1980)
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), relied upon by defendant, is distinguishable from the instant case in that the search there involved an automobile and that, at the time of the search, the luggage searched was not within the immediate control of the defendant.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Mr. Justice Stevens joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the Court’s judgment but cannot join its unnecessarily broad opinion, which seems to treat this case as if it involved the “automobile” exception to the warrant requirement. It is not such a case.
Because the police officers had probable cause to believe that respondent’s green suitcase contained marihuana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab, their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). The essence of our holding in Chadwick is that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a trunk or suitcase accompanying or being carried by a person; that expectation of privacy is not *767 diminished simply because the owner’s arrest occurs in a public place. Whether arrested in a hotel lobby, an airport, a railroad terminal, or on a public street, as here, the owner has the right to expect that the contents of his luggage will not, without his consent, be exposed on demand of the police. If not carrying contraband, many persons arrested in such circumstances might choose to consent to a search of their luggage to obviate any delay in securing their release. But even if wholly innocent, some persons might well prefer not to have the contents of their luggage exposed in a public place. They may stand on their right to privacy and require a search warrant. The warrant requirement is not so onerous as to command suspension of Fourth Amendment guarantees once the receptacle involved is securely in the control of the police, as it was here after Sanders’ arrest.
The breadth of the Court’s opinion and its repeated references to the “automobile” from which respondent’s suitcase was seized at the time of his arrest, however, might lead the reader to believe — as the dissenters apparently do — that this case involves the “automobile” exception to the warrant requirement. See ante, at 762-765, and n. 14. It does not. Here, as in Chadwick , it was the luggage being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the automobile in which it was being carried, that was the suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick . The fact that the suitcase was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of respondent’s arrest does not turn this into an “automobile” exception case. The Court need say no more.
This case simply does not present the question of whether a warrant is required before opening luggage when the police have probable cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not know whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed in some part of the car’s structure. *768 I am not sure whether that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a warrant to search the suitcase when a warrantless search of the automobile is otherwise permissible. But it seems to me it would be better to await a case in which the question must be decided.
The dissent complains that the Court does not adopt a “clear” rule, presumably one capable of resolving future Fourth Amendment litigation. That is not cause for lament, however desirable it might be to fashion a universal prescription governing the myriad Fourth Amendment cases that might arise. We are construing the Constitution, not writing a statute or a manual for law enforcement officers. My disagreement with the Court’s opinion is very different from that of the dissenters. Our institutional practice, based on hard experience, generally has been to refrain from deciding questions not presented by the facts of a case; there are risks in formulating constitutional rules broader than required by the facts to which they are applied. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (1936).