Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization

Mr. Justice Stewart,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, * dissenting.

My disagreement with the opinion and judgment of the Court in these cases is narrow but dispositive. Because 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) refers to “any Act of Congress providing for equal rights,” because 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is such an Act of Congress, and because § 1983 by its terms clearly covers lawsuits such as the ones here involved, I would hold that the plaintiffs properly brought these cases in Federal District Court. 1

*673 First of all, it seems to me clear that this Court has already-settled the question whether § 1983 creates a cause of action for these plaintiffs. We have explicitly recognized that the case of “ 397 U. S. 397 (1970), held that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 675 . 2 And a long line of this Court’s cases necessarily stands for that proposition. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U. S. 125 ; Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725 ; Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 ; Edelman v. Jordan, supra; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 ; Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 ; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 ; Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669 ; Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 ; California Dept. of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U. S. 121 ; Dandridge v. *674 Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 ; King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 ; Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 . I think it is far too late in the day, therefore, to argue that the plaintiffs in these cases did not state causes of action cognizable in the federal courts.

Even if this impressive weight of authority did not exist, however, and the question before us were one of first impression, it seems clear to me that the plain language of § 1983 would dictate the same result.' For that statute confers a cause of action for the deprivation under color of state law of “any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws.” Only if the legislative history showed unambiguously that those words cannot mean what they say would it be possible to conclude that there were no federal causes of action in the present cases. But, as the Court correctly states, “the legislative history of the provisions at issue in these cases ultimately provides us with little guidance as to the proper resolution of the question presented here.” Ante, at 610.

The Court's reading of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) results in the conclusion that Congress intended § 1983 to create some causes of action which could not be heard in a federal court under § 1343 (3), even though §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) both originated in the same statute (§ 1 of the so-called Ku Klux Klan Act). This anomaly is quite contrary to the Court's jmderstanding up to now that “the common origin of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) in § 1 of the 1871 Act suggests that the two provisions were meant to be, and are, complementary.” Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 583 . See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 542-552 .

Section 1983 is a statute “providing for equal rights.” The Revised Statutes of 1874 included § 1979, the predecessor of § 1983, in Title XXIV, entitled “Civil Rights.” Several sections in the Title, including § 1979, were cross-referenced to the predecessors of § 1343 (3), Rev. Stat. §§ 563 (12) and 629 (16). In the context of the Revised Statues, the term “pro *675 viding for equal rights” found in § 629 (16) served to identify the sections of the Civil Rights Title which involved rights enforceable through civil actions.

The Court’s reasoning to the contrary seems to rely solely on the fact that § 1983 does not create any rights. Section 1343 (3) does not require, however, that the Act create rights. Nor does it require that the Act “provide” them. It refers to any Act of Congress that provides “for” equal rights. Section 1983 provides for rights when it creates a cause of action for deprivation of those rights under color of state law. It is, therefore, one of the statutes for which § 1343 (3), by its terms, confers jurisdiction upon the federal district courts.

Today’s decision may not have a great effect on the scope of federal jurisdiction. If the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, any plaintiff raising a federal question may bring an action in federal court under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a). Many other sections of Title 28 confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts over statutory questions without any requirement that a monetary minimum be in controversy. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1333 (admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); 28 U. S. C. § 1334 (bankruptcy); 28 U. S. C. § 1337 (Acts of Congress regulating commerce). Still other plaintiffs will find their way into the federal courts through jurisdictional provisions codified with the substantive law, and not incorporated in Title 28. See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. § 2614 (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974); 15 U. S. C. § 1640 (e) (Truth in Lending Act); 42 U. S. C. § 7604 (1976 ed., Supp. I) (Clean Air Act). Finally, even a welfare recipient with a federal statutory claim may sue in a federal court if his lawyer can link this claim to a substantial constitutional contention. And under the standard of substantiality established by Ha-gans v. Lavine, supra, such a constitutional claim would not be hard to construct.

But to sacrifice even one lawsuit to the Court’s cramped reading of 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) is to deprive a plaintiff of a *676 federal forum without justification in the language or history of the law.

I respectfully dissent.

Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall believe that the issue discussed in footnote 2 of this dissenting opinion need not be addressed in this case. They therefore express no view of the merits of that particular question.

Accordingly, I do not reach the question whether jurisdiction may also exist by reason of § 1343 (4), or the Supremacy Clause argument. I do agree with the Court that the Social Security Act itself is not a *673 statute securing “equal rights” within § 1343 (3) or “civil rights” within § 1343 (4). Moreover, since the Court does not reach the merits in either of these cases, I see no need to discuss them, except to note that the result in No. 77-5324 is clearly controlled by Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725 .

Mr. Justice Black, joined by The Chief Justice, argued in dissent in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 430 , that the plaintiff’s claims should not be cognizable in a federal court. They argued that primary jurisdiction to consider whether state law comported -with the Social Security Act should rest with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The dissenting opinion did not suggest, however, that, apart from considerations of primary jurisdiction, no cause of action existed under § 1983.

Although the Court rejected the dissent’s primary-jurisdiction argument for cases brought under the Social Security Act, a similar doctrine may restrict § 1983 suits brought for violations of other federal statutes. When a state official is alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983. For example, a suit alleging that a State has violated Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must comply with the procedural requirements of that Act, even though such a suit falls within the language of § 1983.