holding that “[a]n express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[a]n express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”
- holding that “An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver____ The question of the validity of the waiver is not one of form____'”
- ruling that an express written waiver is "strong proof" of valid waiver but is not necessary to establish waiver and noting that "it appears that every court that has considered this question has now reached the same conclusion"
- holding that express waiver of Miranda rights is not required and that “in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. My joinder, however, rests on the assumption that the Court’s citation to Johnson v. *377 Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938), ante, at 374-375, is not meant to suggest that the “intentional relinquishment of a known right” formula — the formula Zerbst articulated for determining the waiver vel non “of fundamental constitutional rights,” 304 U. S., at 464 — has any relevance in determining whether a defendant has waived his “right to the presence of a lawyer,” ante, at 374, under Miranda’s prophylactic rule.