holding that except in situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspiciorr that a nrotorist is unlicensed or that an autonrobile is not registered, or that eithcr the vehicle or an occupant is otherwisc subject to seizurc for violation of law, stopping iln autonrobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivcr's license and the registration of tl-re autonrobilc are unreasonable rtndcr thc Fourth Anrendr-ner-rt
How later courts described this case
- holding that except in situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspiciorr that a nrotorist is unlicensed or that an autonrobile is not registered, or that eithcr the vehicle or an occupant is otherwisc subject to seizurc for violation of law, stopping iln autonrobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivcr's license and the registration of tl-re autonrobilc are unreasonable rtndcr thc Fourth Anrendr-ner-rt
- holding that that "except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment"
- holding that “except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion . . . stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and registration . . . are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude the State . . . from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion”
- holding that "except in those situations in which there is at least, articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile arid detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475 (2001)
We reject Fort’s importation of the Prouse standard into the Burger analysis.
Disagreed with by United States v. M.J., 716 F. Supp. 295 (1989)
We disagree with the Magistrate’s reading of Prouse, and reverse.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State of Texas v. Ryan William Luxon (2007)
Prouse is distinguishable from our case in
Distinguished by State v. Covington, 138 N.C. App. 688 (2000)
However, the Prouse Court stated this rule is inapplicable in situations where there is an “articulable and reasonable suspicion” that an occupant of the vehicle is subject to seizure for violation of the law.
Distinguished by Carson v. Com., 404 S.E.2d 919 (1991)
We disagree with the defendant's assertion that Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), is the controlling authority in this case.
Distinguished by Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 497 (1991)
We disagree with the defendant’s assertion that Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), is the controlling authority in this case.
The opinion
MR. Justice Blackmun,
with whom Mr. Justice Powell joins,
concurring.
The Court, ante, this page, carefully protects from the reach of its decision other less intrusive spot checks “that do not in *664 volve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.” The roadblock stop for all traffic is given as an example. I necessarily assume that the Court’s reservation also includes other not purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a given point) that equate with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock stop. And I would not regard the present case as a precedent that throws any constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the performance of their duties. In a situation of that type, it seems to me, the Court’s balancing process, and the value factors under consideration, would be quite different.
With this understanding, I join the Court’s opinion and its judgment.