Opinion

Detroit Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board

  • 440 U.S. 301
  • 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2728
  • 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8939
  • 99 S. Ct. 1123
  • 59 L. Ed. 2d 333
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Mar 5, 1979
Status
Published
Author
Stevens
On the bench
Blackmun, Burger, Powell, Stevens, Stewart, White
Cited by
279 cases

determining employer “in resisting an unconsented-to disclosure” of the results of “psychological aptitude testing” did not violate the “statu- tory obligation to bargain in good faith,” and taking judicial notice of “the sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence”

How later courts described this case

  • determining employer “in resisting an unconsented-to disclosure” of the results of “psychological aptitude testing” did not violate the “statu- tory obligation to bargain in good faith,” and taking judicial notice of “the sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence”
  • holding that NLRB abused its discretion in requiring employer to release to union certain employee aptitude tests used to screen job applicants, in part because the “remedy selected by the Board does not adequately *314 protect the security of the tests”
  • stating that “unless a party’s neglect to press an exception before the Board is excused by the statutory ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exception or unless the Board determination at issue is patently in excess of its authority, we are bound by it”
  • holding that NLRB erred in requiring employer to disclose performance test scores of employees as information for collective bargaining, regardless of employee consent, because of the sensitive nature of the test scores

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

This is a close case on both issues. With respect to the test battery and answer sheets, I agree with Mr. Justice White that we should respect the Board’s exercise of its broad remedial discretion. On the other hand, I agree with the Court that the Union should not be permitted to invade the individual employees’ interest in the confidentiality of their test scores without their consent. Accordingly, I join all but Part II-A of the Court’s opinion and also join Part I of Mr. Justice White’s dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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