finding "no reason, therefore, to use sex as a proxy for need" where the alimony statute already provided for individualized hearings that took financial circumstances into account
How later courts described this case
- finding "no reason, therefore, to use sex as a proxy for need" where the alimony statute already provided for individualized hearings that took financial circumstances into account
- holding unconstitutional an Alabama statutory scheme of imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
- stating that a federal litigant may win a constitutional challenge without ultimately whining the relief he specifically requested
- explaining that to survive intermediate scrutiny, practice must further state’s interest better than would its absence.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Koskinen, 72 F. Supp. 3d 963 (2014)
For this reason, the case plaintiffs cite, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979), is distinguishable.
Distinguished by In Re Estate of Miltenberger, 482 Mich. 901 (2008)
But Orr is distinguishable for significant reasons that exemplify the differences between the case before us and the cases on which the dissent relies.
Distinguished by Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326 (1987)
See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 1111 n. 8, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (holding that Pullman is inapplicable when the state court has already considered the issue).
Distinguished by Richardson v. Richardson, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 324 (1980)
As to the issues raised by Mr. Richardson, we agree with the Trial Court that Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979), is inapplicable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Whether Mr. Orr has a continuing contractual obligation to pay alimony to Mrs. Orr is a question of Alabama law that the Alabama courts have not yet decided. In Part I-B of his opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist seems to be making one of two alternative suggestions:
(1) that we should decide the state-law issue; or
*285 (2) that we should direct the Supreme Court of Alabama to decide that issue before deciding the federal constitutional issue.
In my judgment the Court has correctly rejected both of these alternatives. To accept either — or a rather confused blend of the two — would violate principles of federalism that transcend the significance of this case. * I therefore join the Court's opinion.
Even if I could agree with Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s view that Mr. Orr’s probability of success on the state-law issue is so remote that we should deny him standing to argue the federal question decided by the Alabama Supreme Court, I still would not understand how he reached the conclusion that the litigation between Mr. and Mrs. Orr is not a "case or controversy” within the meaning of Art. III.