explaining that ballot access restrictions, in particular, burden two fundamental rights: “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that ballot access restrictions, in particular, burden two fundamental rights: “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively”
- holding unconstitutional an Illinois statutory requirement that new political parties and independent candidates for elections in po *876 litical subdivisions gather more than the number of signatures required for elections for statewide office
- holding there is no rational reason to require more than 5% signatures in a smaller unit when that number of signatures would exceed 25,000 because the state’s interests were satisfied with 25,000 signatures for a statewide race
- holding that state could not justify discrepancy between high signa- ture requirements for election to local office in Chicago--more than 35,000 qualified voters--and lower requirement for statewide office --25,000 voters
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
Although I join the Court’s opinion and its strict-scrutiny approach for election cases, I add these comments to record purposefully, and perhaps somewhat belatedly, my unrelieved discomfort with what seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as “compelling [state] interest” and “least drastic [or restrictive] means.” See, ante, at 184, 185, and 186. I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a “compelling state interest” is. If it means “convincingly controlling,” or “incapable of being overcome” upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me, “least drastic means” is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less “drastic” or a little less “restrictive” in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to *189 vote to strike legislation down. This is reminiscent of the Court's indulgence, a few decades ago, in substantive due process in the economic area as a means of nullification.
I feel, therefore, and have always felt, that these phrases are really not very helpful for constitutional analysis. They are too convenient and result oriented, and I must endeavor to disassociate myself from them. Apart from their use, however, the result the Court reaches here is the correct one. It is with these reservations that I join the Court’s opinion.