finding privity between the government and the civil contractor plaintiff in a prior action barred the government’s subsequent suit where the government had required the contractor’s lawsuit to be filed; reviewed and approved its complaint; paid its attorneys’ fees and costs; directed the appeal from the state trial court to the Supreme Court; appeared before and submitted an amicus brief in the Montana Supreme Court; directed the filing of a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court; and “effectuated” the company’s abandonment of that appeal
How later courts described this case
- finding privity between the government and the civil contractor plaintiff in a prior action barred the government’s subsequent suit where the government had required the contractor’s lawsuit to be filed; reviewed and approved its complaint; paid its attorneys’ fees and costs; directed the appeal from the state trial court to the Supreme Court; appeared before and submitted an amicus brief in the Montana Supreme Court; directed the filing of a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court; and “effectuated” the company’s abandonment of that appeal
- holding that, although the contract at issue in the second proceeding did not contain a critical provision included in the contract at issue in the original action, collateral estoppel was still applicable in order to prevent “ ‘redundant litigation [over] the identical question of the statute’s application ____’” because “the factual and legal context ... ha[d] not materially altered” (quoting Tait v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. at 624, 53 S.Ct. 706) (alteration in original)
- finding control-type nonparty preclusion appropriate where the nonparty: (1) caused the earlier lawsuit to be filed; (2) reviewed and approved the complaint; (3) paid the attorneys’ fees and costs; (4) directed the appeal to the Montana Supreme Court; (5) appeared and submitted a brief as amicus therein; (6) directed the filing of an appeal to the Supreme Court; and (7) on the advice of the Solicitor General, caused the captioned party to abandon that appeal
- holding that collateral estoppel precludes “parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate[,] protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Blair v. Taxation Division Director, 9 N.J. Tax 345 (1987)
In a relatively recent opinion, however, the validity of the “separable facts” test in Sunnen, was called into question by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979).
Limited by Campbell v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. 1241 (2001)
The separable facts doctrine has been questioned and limited by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 99 S. Ct. 970 (1979).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., 63 F.3d 1227 (1995)
In particular, the Court analogized to its decision in Montana, where it “determined that the exception was inapplicable because of the close alignment of time and subject matter between the [two actions],”11 id. at 172, 104 S.Ct. at 579.
Distinguished by In Re Queeny/Corinthos, 503 F. Supp. 365 (1980)
440 U.S. 147, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion on the customary understanding that its references to law review articles and drafts or finally adopted versions of the Restatement of Judgments are not intended to bind the Court to the views expressed therein on issues not presented by the facts of this case.