holding, in a case where the plaintiff privately complained to her employer of racial discrimination in the workplace, that “[njeither the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that th[e] freedom [of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”
How later courts described this case
- holding, in a case where the plaintiff privately complained to her employer of racial discrimination in the workplace, that “[njeither the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that th[e] freedom [of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”
- finding that a teacher’s communication with her principal about the school's alleged racially discriminatory practices was constitutionally protected and emphasizing “that a public employee [does not forfeit] his protection against governmental abridgement of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately rather than publicly”
- holding that the First Amendment protected a teacher’s complaints “involv[ing] employment policies and practices at the school which [Plaintiff] conceived to be racially discriminatory” even when those complaints were “privately expressed . . . to the principal”
- holding that the “claimant must show that ‘but for’ the protected expression the employer would not have taken the alleged retaliatory action.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Because this Court’s opinion in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 , had not been announced when the District Court decided this case, it did not expressly find that respondents would have rehired petitioner if she had not engaged in constitutionally protected conduct. The District Court did find, however, that petitioner’s protected conduct was the “primary” reason for respondents’ decision. * The *418 Court of Appeals regarded that finding as foreclosing respondents’ Mt. Healthy claim. In essence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court would have made an appropriate finding on the issue if it had had access to our Mt. Healthy opinion.
My understanding of the District Court’s finding is the same as the Court of Appeals’. Nevertheless, I agree that the District Court should have the. opportunity to decide whether there is any need for further proceedings on the issue. If that court regards the present record as adequate to enable it to supplement its original findings without taking additional evidence, it is free to do so. On that understanding, I join the Court’s opinion.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. See also id., at 36a, where the District Court stated that petitioner’s protected activity was “almost entirely” responsible for her termination.