Opinion

Lalli v. Lalli

  • 439 U.S. 259
  • 99 S. Ct. 518
  • 58 L. Ed. 2d 503
  • 1978 U.S. LEXIS 145
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Dec 11, 1978
Status
Published
Author
Brennan
On the bench
Powell, Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens
Cited by
360 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.1%

holding that § 4‐1.2 bars children born out of wedlock, but not those born in wedlock, from exercising inheritance rights if they lack proper evidence of paternity

How later courts described this case

  • holding that § 4‐1.2 bars children born out of wedlock, but not those born in wedlock, from exercising inheritance rights if they lack proper evidence of paternity
  • stating that the Court has long recognized that a state’s goal to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death “is an area with which the States have an interest of considerable magnitude”
  • upholding statute that allowed illegitimate children to inherit unconditionally from their mothers, but allowed inheritance from an intestate father only where a court order declaring paternity was entered during the father’s lifetime, finding the evidentiary requirement substantially related to the state’s interest in avoiding the difficulties associated with proof of paternity and exposure to spurious claims
  • noting that the purpose of a statutory evidentiary standard for proof of paternity allowing illegitimate children to inherit from their intestate fathers is to grant illegitimates insofar as practicable rights of inheritance on a par with those of legitimate children

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Daniels ex rel. Daniels v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 1516 (1992)

    This court distinguished Lalli based on the court’s conclusion that the Alabama law, as applied to the facts in Handley, effectively fore
    Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitDec 30, 1992Read it

The opinion

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 (1977), declares that the state interest in the accurate and efficient determination of paternity can be adequately served by requiring the illegitimate child to offer into evidence a “formal acknowledgment of paternity.” Id., at' 772 n. 14. The New York statute is inconsistent with this command. Under the New York scheme, an illegitimate child may inherit intestate only if there has been a judicial finding of paternity during the lifetime of the father.

The present case illustrates the injustice of the departure from Trimble worked by today’s decision sustaining the New York rule. All interested parties concede that Robert Lalli is the son of Mario Lalli. Mario Lalli supported Robert during his son’s youth. Mario Lalli formally acknowledged Robert Lalli as his son. See In re Lalli, 38 N. Y. 2d 77, 79, 340 N. E. 2d 721, 722 (1975). Yet, for want of a judicial order of filiation entered during Mario’s lifetime, Robert Lalli is denied his intestate share of his father’s estate.

*278 There is no reason to suppose that the injustice of the present case is aberrant. Indeed it is difficult to imagine an instance in which an illegitimate child, acknowledged and voluntarily supported by his father, would ever inherit intestate under the New York scheme. Social welfare agencies, busy as they are with errant fathers, are unlikely to bring paternity proceedings against fathers who support their children. Similarly, children who are acknowledged and supported by their fathers are unlikely to bring paternity proceedings against them. First, they are unlikely to see the need for such adversary proceedings. Second, even if aware of the rule requiring judicial filiation orders, they are likely to fear provoking disharmony by suing their fathers. For the same reasons, mothers of such illegitimates are unlikely to bring proceedings against the fathers. Finally, fathers who do not even bother to make out wills (and thus die intestate) are unlikely to take the time to bring formal filiation proceedings. Thus, as a practical matter, by requiring judicial filiation orders entered during the lifetime of the fathers, the New York statute makes it virtually impossible for acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate children to inherit intestate.

Two interests are said to justify this discrimination against illegitimates. First, it is argued, reliance upon mere formal public acknowledgments of paternity would open the door to fraudulent claims of paternity. I cannot accept this argument. I adhere to the view that when “a father has formally acknowledged his child . . . there is no possible difficulty of proof, and no opportunity for fraud or error. This purported interest '[in avoiding fraud] . . . can offer no justification for distinguishing between a formally acknowledged illegitimate child and a legitimate one.” Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532, 552 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

But even if my confidence in the accuracy of formal public acknowledgments of paternity were unfounded, New York has available less drastic means of screening out fraudulent *279 claims of paternity. In addition to requiring formal acknowledgments of paternity, New York might require illegitimates to prove paternity by an elevated standard of proof, e. g., clear and convincing evidence, or even beyond a reasonable doubt. Certainly here, where there is no factual dispute as to the relationship between Robert and Mario Lalli, there is no justification for denying Robert Lalli his intestate share.

Second, it is argued, the New York statute protects estates from belated claims by unknown illegitimates. I find this justification even more tenuous than the first. Publication notice and a short limitations period in which claims against the estate could be filed could serve the asserted state interest as well as, if not better than, the present scheme. In any event, the fear that unknown illegitimates might assert belated claims hardly justifies cutting off the rights of known illegiti-mates such as Robert Lalli. I am still of the view that the state interest in the speedy and efficient determination of paternity “is completely served by public acknowledgment of parentage and simply does not apply to the case of acknowledged illegitimate children.” Id., at 558 n. 30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

I see no reason to retreat from our decision in Trimble v. Gordon . The New York statute on review here, like the Illinois statute in Trimble , excludes “forms of proof which do not compromise the State [’s] interests.” Trimble v. Gordon, supra, at 772 n. 14. The statute thus discriminates against illegitimates through means not substantially related to the legitimate interests that the statute purports to promote. I would invalidate the statute.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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