stating standards for municipal government § 1983 liability. Claims asserting nvunicipal liability pursuant to § 1983 are commonly referred to as Afonell claims. Similarly, apart from the statute of limitations bar, Plaintiff's claims against the City of Newark could not proceed based on the dismissal of his underlying civil rights claims against the Officer Defendants. See Mulholland v. Gov't County of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227 , 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) eat is well-settled that, if there is no violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.”
How later courts described this case
- stating standards for municipal government § 1983 liability. Claims asserting nvunicipal liability pursuant to § 1983 are commonly referred to as Afonell claims. Similarly, apart from the statute of limitations bar, Plaintiff's claims against the City of Newark could not proceed based on the dismissal of his underlying civil rights claims against the Officer Defendants. See Mulholland v. Gov't County of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227 , 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) eat is well-settled that, if there is no violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.”
- holding that a municipality cannot 26 be held liable for the actions of its employees under § 1983 unless the municipality’s policy 27 4 As the Court explains later in this order, in the absence of a federal question, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Thus, the Court 28 ultimately would not consider those claims, regardless of whether they were briefed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a), (c). 1 or custom was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional harm
- holding that, to state a claim for municipal liability, a 2 SEPTA and its employees have been found to “act under color of state law” and are therefore state actors subject to liability under § 1983. Ford v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 374 F. App’x 325 , 326 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Bolden v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807 , 821 (3d Cir. 1991). plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation
- holding that “[l]ocal governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” and for “practices of state officials so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097 (1991)
, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (rejecting pendent party jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976) (rejecting pendent party jurisdiction over county in section 1983 action); see also Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2402 n. 12, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 43…
Questioned by Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097 (1990)
03, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (rejecting pendent party jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976) (rejecting pendent party jurisdiction over county in section 1983 action); see also Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2402 n. 12, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,…
Questioned by Revilla v. Glanz, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (2014)
The Seventh Circuit, very recently, called into question the reasoning behind applying Monell to private corporations.
Limited by Pierce ex rel. Pierce v. Delta County Department of Social Services, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (2000)
Although Monell holds that municipalities and other local governmental bodies are persons within the meaning of section 1983, the Monell court limited its holding to “local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Limited by Yarbrough v. Illinois Department of Mental Health, 538 F. Supp. 414 (1982)
the Court explicitly limited its holding to “local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” 436 U.S. at 690 n.54, 98 S.Ct. at 2035 n.54.
Limited by Roybal-Mack v. N.M. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (2017)
However, in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police , the Supreme Court specifically noted that Monell had limited its holding "to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (Eleventh Amendment barred action against Michigan Department of State Police and its director) (citing Monell , 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.…
Distinguished
Distinguished by Wilson v. Hays, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (2017)
) However, because Hays is an individual, Monell is inapplicable, and Plaintiff’s second claim against Hays fails.
Distinguished by Coleman v. Hamilton County, 104 F. Supp. 3d 877 (2015)
It is true that if the Court were to credit Defendant’s version of the facts— that is, Chairman Henry merely told the deputy to escort Moyer to his seat and said nothing else prompting the deputy to remove Moyer and Coleman from the meeting — it may well be able to conclude that Monell is inapplicable and that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Distinguished by Oxford Bank & Trust & Fifth Avenue Property Management v. Village of La Grange, 879 F. Supp. 2d 954 (2012)
Wilson indeed draws this distinction and states that “a complaint asserting municipal liability under Monell by definition states a claim to which Parratt is inapposite.
Distinguished by Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422 (2006)
436 U.S. 658, 692-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (holding that respondeat superior is inapplicable in section 1983 cases).
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring in part.
Since Parts II and IV of the opinion of the Court are merely advisory and are not necessary to explain the Court’s decision, I join only Parts I, III, and V.