stating that, under the Fourth Amendment, “ ‘one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant’ ”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, under the Fourth Amendment, “ ‘one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant’ ”
- reasoning that where fire personnel entered a building in response to a fire, departed when darkness hindered their work, and then re-entered shortly after daylight to continue their investigation, the warrantless re-entry was lawful as a continuation of the first entry
- holding that, while administrative search warrants issued without probable cause can be used to investigate the cause of a fire, search warrants based on probable cause must be used where authorities are seeking evidence that will be used in a criminal investigation
- ruling that while no warrant is necessary for entry to fight a fire and to remain thereafter to investigate the cause, “additional entries to investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned — as noted by a later court
Six years later, in Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984), the Supreme Court limited its holding in Tyler as follows:
in partmedium confidenceDisagreed with by Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 36 (1986)
We reject the argument based on Tyler to the effect that Officer Cobb’s search would have been a “good search” had he but first entered the building the previous night before deciding it was too hot, wet and dark to conduct an investigation, and then left, but because he simply stood outside the building and, based on personal observation, years of experience as a fire marshall, and common sens
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Bradford, 2000 Minn. LEXIS 801 (2000)
Both Clifford and Tyler are distinguishable because the officers in those cases did not re-enter the premises with a valid search warrant.
Distinguished by United States v. Ronald Joseph Bute, United States of America v. Beverly Bute, A/K/A Beverly M. York, A/K/A Beverly M. Jensen, 43 F.3d 531 (1994)
As such, the exigency identified in Tyler for the protection of property against an immediate threat is inapplicable here.
Distinguished by People v. Duncan, 42 Cal. 3d 91 (1986)
But Tyler is distinguishable: in that case, police officers repeatedly entered and exited a fire-gutted building without a warrant in order to investigate for possible arson.
Distinguished by City of Willoughby Hills v. C. C. Bars, Inc., 18 Ohio Misc. 2d 8 (1984)
Defendant’s citations, of Marshall w, Barlow’s, Inc. (1978), 436 U.S. 307, and Michigan v. Tyler, supra, are distinguishable in that they involve areas which were not open to the public.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join in all but Part IY-A of the opinion, from which I dissent. I agree with the Court that:
“[A]n entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to investigate the cause of *515 the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches.” Ante, at 511.
The Michigan Supreme Court found that the warrantless searches, at 8 and 9 a. m. were not, in fact, continuations of the earlier entry under exigent circumstances * and therefore ruled inadmissible all evidence derived from those searches. The Court offers no sound basis for overturning this conclusion of the state court that the subsequent re-entries were distinct from the original entry. Even if, under the Court’s “reasonable time” criterion, the firemen might have stayed in the building for an additional four hours — a proposition which is by no means clear — the fact remains that the firemen did not choose to remain and continue their search, but instead locked the door and departed from the premises entirely. The fact that the firemen were willing to leave demonstrates that the exigent circumstances justifying their original warrantless entry were no longer present. The situation is thus analogous to that in G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 358-359 (1977):
“The agents’ own action ... in their delay for two days following their first entry, and for more than one day following the observation of materials being moved from the office, before they made the entry during which they seized the records, is sufficient to support the District Court’s implicit finding that there were no exigent circumstances. . . .”
To hold that some subsequent re-entries are “continuations” *516 of earlier ones will not aid firemen, but confuse them, for it will be difficult to predict in advance how a court might view a re-entry. In the end, valuable evidence may be- excluded for failure to seek a warrant that might have easily been obtained.
Those investigating fires and their causes deserve a clear demarcation of the constitutional limits of their authority. Today’s opinion recognizes the need for speed and focuses attention on fighting an ongoing blaze. The firetruek need not stop at the courthouse in rushing to the flames. But once the fire has been extinguished and the firemen have left the premises, the emergency is over. Further intrusion on private property can and should be accompanied by a warrant indicating the authority under which the firemen presume to enter and search.
There is another reason for holding that re-entry after the initial departure required a proper warrant. The state courts found that at the time of the first re-entry a criminal investigation was under way and that the purpose of the officers in re-entering was to gather evidence of crime. Unless we are to ignore these findings, a warrant was necessary. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), did not differ with Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959), that searches for criminal evidence are of special significance under the Fourth Amendment.
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized that “[i]f there are exigent circumstances, such as reason to believe that the destruction of evidence is imminent or that a further entry of the premises is necessary to prevent the recurrence of the fire, no warrant is required and evidence discovered is admissible.” 399 Mich. 564, 578 , 250 N. W. 2d 467, 474 (1977). It found, however, that “[i]n the instant case there were no exigent circumstances justifying the searches made hours, days or weeks after the fire was extinguished.” Id., at 579 , 250 N. W. 2d, at 475 .