holding that courts presume a jury follows a trial court’s instructions, but a jury may properly disregard statements made by counsel
How later courts described this case
- holding that courts presume a jury follows a trial court’s instructions, but a jury may properly disregard statements made by counsel
- holding that “the combination of the skeletal [jury] instructions, the possible harmful inferences from the references to the indictment, and the repeated suggestions that petitioner’s status as a defendant tended to establish his guilt created a genuine danger that the jury would convict [him] on the basis of those extraneous considerations, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial”
- holding that, in light of its rather “Spartan instructions” on the burden of proof together with other circumstances potentially prejudicial to the defendant, the trial court’s failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence violated the petitioner’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
- recognizing that a "presumption of innocence” instruction significantly aids the jury in understanding the prosecutor's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and also provides one means of explaining to the jury the accused’s constitutional right to be judged solely upon the evidence adduced at trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Greaves, 94 N.Y.2d 775 (1999)
(436 US 478) are distinguishable and therefore do not compel a different result.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Conley, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 137 (1997)
Taylor, supra, is also distinguishable because it does not relate to the use of restraints on a defendant.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion because in reversing petitioner’s conviction it reaffirms that “the ‘presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice,’ ” ante, at 479, quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 503 (1976). It follows from this proposition, as is clear from the *491 Court’s opinion, that trial judges should instruct the jury on a criminal defendant’s entitlement to a presumption of innocence in all cases where such an instruction is requested.