holding that a forum state could not obtain personal jurisdiction over a parent in a custody action simply because the parent agreed to a visitation arrangement with the other parent and the other parent took the child to the forum state and initiated suit, as this would “arbitrarily subject one parent to suit in any State of the Union where the other parent chose to spend time while having custody of their offspring pursuant to a separation agreement”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a forum state could not obtain personal jurisdiction over a parent in a custody action simply because the parent agreed to a visitation arrangement with the other parent and the other parent took the child to the forum state and initiated suit, as this would “arbitrarily subject one parent to suit in any State of the Union where the other parent chose to spend time while having custody of their offspring pursuant to a separation agreement”
- holding that, although California’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a New York resident was unreasonable, “a New York court would clearly 17 have personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] and, if a judgment were entered by a New York court . . . , it could properly be enforced against him in both New York and California”
- holding that father who acquiesced to daughter’s living with mother who moved to California following marital separation did not purposefully avail himself of benefits and protections of California law to satisfy due process requirements
- holding 680 M. K. N. v. Dabbour that a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non- resident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within the state would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bartsch v. Bartsch, 2001 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 207 (2001)
See J.L.H., 737 P.2d at 919 n. 13 (“Kulko [v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978),] is distinguishable [from a case in which no money judgment is sought] because it deals with jurisdiction to enforce liability arising from status rather than with determination of status.”).
Distinguished by Sharp v. Sharp, 336 N.J. Super. 492 (2001)
In Johnson, we distinguished the facts from those in Kulko, as follows:
Distinguished by Daknis v. Burns, 278 A.D.2d 641 (2000)
We also reject respondent’s assertion that she was denied due process in Family Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over her in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kulko v Superior Ct. (436 US 84), where the Court held that mere acquiescence by a custodial parent to a child’s change of residence to another State will not confer personal jurisdiction over that parent in the new State (id., at 94).
Distinguished by Vasquez, 428 Mass. 842 (1999)
Several courts have specifically noted that the minimum contacts analysis applied in Kulko is inapplicable in the criminal context.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell join,
dissenting.
The Court properly treats this case as presenting a single narrow question. That question is whether the California Supreme Court correctly “weighed” “the facts,” ante, at 92, of this particular case in applying the settled “constitutional standard,” ibid., that before state courts may exercise in *102 personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled in the State, it must appear that the nonresident has “certain minimum contacts [with the forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.5 '' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945). The Court recognizes that “this determination is one in which few answers will be written 'in black and white/ '' ante, at 92. I cannot say that the Court's determination against state-court in personam jurisdiction is implausible, but, though the issue is close, my independent weighing of the facts leads me to conclude, in agreement with the analysis and determination of the California Supreme Court, that appellant's connection with the State of California was not too attenuated, under the standards of reasonableness and fairness implicit in the Due Process Clause, to require him to conduct his defense in the California courts. I therefore dissent.