holding that dismissal was academic when it “rested on the academic judgment of school officials that [student] did not have the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that dismissal was academic when it “rested on the academic judgment of school officials that [student] did not have the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision.”
- holding that a student was “awarded at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires” because the ”school fully informed respondent of the faculty’s dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the danger that this posed to timely graduation and continued enrollment” and the “ultimate decision to dismiss the respondent was careful and deliberate”
- explaining that there are “far less stringent procedural requirements in the case of an academic dismissal” and noting that “the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking”
- holding that “[t]he need for flexibility is well illustrated by the significant difference between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct. This difference calls for far less stringent procedural requirements in the case of an academic dismissal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Morris v. Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 15617 (2009)
Horowitz is easily distinguishable because in that case the dismissal was for purely academic reasons, whereas here, FAMU is clearly basing its dismissal of Morris on alleged fraudulent conduct.
Distinguished by Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775 (1991)
Moreover, Horowitz is distinguishable from the instant case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II-A, and III of the Court’s opinion and concur in the judgment.
I agree with my Brother Blackmun that it is unnecessary to decide whether respondent had a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest or precisely what minimum procedures were required to divest her of that interest if it is assumed she had one. Whatever that minimum is, the procedures accorded her satisfied or exceeded that minimum.
The Court nevertheless assumes the existence of a protected interest, proceeds to classify repondent’s expulsion as an “academic dismissal,” and concludes that no hearing of any kind or any opportunity to respond is required in connection with such an action. Because I disagree with this conclusion, *97 I feel constrained to say so and to concur only in the judgment.
As I see it, assuming a protected interest, respondent was at the minimum entitled to be informed of the reasons for her dismissal and to an opportunity personally to state her side of the story. Of course, she had all this, and more. I also suspect that expelled graduate or college students normally have the opportunity to talk with their expellers and that this sort of minimum requirement will impose no burden that is not already being shouldered and discharged by responsible institutions.