explaining that comparisons between a specific workforce and the general population are appropriate in situations when “the job skill involved…is one that many persons possess or can fairly readily acquire,” but “[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that comparisons between a specific workforce and the general population are appropriate in situations when “the job skill involved…is one that many persons possess or can fairly readily acquire,” but “[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value”
- holding that a “proper comparison” in a case alleging race discrimination in the hiring of public school teachers “was between the racial composition of Hazelwood’s teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor market”
- holding that the proper comparison for a claim of racial discrimina- tion in teaching positions must be between the school's actual teach- ing staff and the racial composition of qualified public school teachers in the relevant market
- holding that the “proper comparison” in a disparate impact case was between the racial composition of the school district’s staff and that of the population of qualified public school teachers in the relevant labor market
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. Similarly to our decision in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, post, p. 406, today’s opinion revolves around the relative factfinding roles of district courts and courts of appeals. It should be plain, however, that the liberal substantive standards for establishing a Title VII violation, including the usefulness of statistical proof, are reconfirmed.
In the present case, the District Court had adopted a wholly inappropriate legal standard of discrimination, and therefore *314 did not evaluate the factual record before it in a meaningful way. This remand in effect orders it to do- so. It is my understanding, as apparently it is MR. Justice Stevens', post, at 318 n. 5, that the statistical inquiry mentioned by the Court, ante, at 311 n. 17, and accompanying text, can be of no help to the Hazelwood School Board in rebutting the Government’s evidence of discrimination. Indeed, even if the relative comparison market is found to be 5.7% rather than 15.4% black, the applicable statistical analysis at most will not serve to bolster the Government’s case. This obviously is of no aid to Hazelwood in meeting its burden of proof. Nonetheless I think that the remand directed by the Court is appropriate and will allow the parties to address these figures and calculations with greater care and precision. I also agree that given the misapplication of governing legal principles by the District Court, Hazelwood reasonably should be given the opportunity to come forward with more focused and specific applicant-flow data in the hope of answering the Government’s prima facie case. If, as presently seems likely, reliable applicant data are found to be lacking, the conclusion reached by my Brother Stevens will inevitably be forthcoming.