holding that a court-ordered program to remedy inequalities resulting from school segregation “fits squarely within the prospective-compliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman” because it “enjoin[s] state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law” in the future operation of schools
How later courts described this case
- holding that a court-ordered program to remedy inequalities resulting from school segregation “fits squarely within the prospective-compliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman” because it “enjoin[s] state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law” in the future operation of schools
- explaining “federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution . . . or if they are imposed upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected by the constitutional violation” (citations omitted)
- explaining that a decree must'be'“tailored to cure the condition that offends” federal law and seek to restore victims of unlawful conduct to the position they would have occupied absent the unlawful conduct (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an injunction to eliminate a segregated school system and share ongoing educational costs among defendants
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Wilson ex rel. Hinn v. North Carolina, 981 F. Supp. 397 (1997)
” Id. It may be argued that because subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have indicated the continuing viability of Young, see Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir.1997) (citing cases), Milliken should be limited to the unique context of school desegregation.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Brown v. State, 975 F. Supp. 2d 209 (2013)
The facts and relief sought in Milliken are clearly distinguishable from those at hand and thus, the Court is not persuaded that the holding supports Plaintiffs’ claims herein.
Distinguished by New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Ass'n v. New York, 911 F. Supp. 2d 111 (2012)
The facts and relief sought in Milliken are clearly distinguishable from those at hand and thus, the Court is not persuaded that the holding supports plaintiffs’ claims herein.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
concurring.
I wholeheartedly join The Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court. My Brother Powell’s opinion prompts these additional comments.
What is, to me, most tragic about this case is that in all relevant respects it is in no way unique. That a northern school board has been found guilty of intentionally discriminatory acts is, unfortunately, not unusual. That the academic development of black children has been impaired by this wrongdoing is to be expected. And, therefore, that a program *292 of remediation is necessary to supplement the primary remedy of pupil reassignment is inevitable.
It is of course true, as Mr. Justice Powell notes, that the Detroit School Board has belatedly recognized its responsibility for the injuries that Negroes have suffered, and has joined in the effort to remedy them.- He may be right— although I hope not — that this makes the case “wholly different from any prior case,” post, this page. But I think it worth noting that the legal issues would be no different if the Detroit School Board came to this Court on the other side. The question before us still would be the one posed by the State: Is the remedy tailored to fit-the scope of the violation? And, as The Chief Justice convincingly demonstrates, that question would have to be answered in the affirmative in light of the findings of the District Court, supported by abundant evidence. Cf. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, post, at 414.