recognizing that “the mutually exclusive sover eignty of the States [is not] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “the mutually exclusive sover eignty of the States [is not] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction”
- concluding that “in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing” and that “[t]he standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
- explaining that mere ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation, without more, was insufficient to form a constitutionally sufficient basis for the court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the stockholder, because the stock sequestered was "not the subject matter of [the] litigation,” and that "the underlying cause of action [was not] related to the [stock]”
- stating that once a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties determines that one person is a debtor to another, there should be no due process problem in the judgment creditor's realizing upon the property of the judgment debtor in another state in which the debtor has property but is not subject to in personam jurisdiction
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, 482 F. Supp. 629 (1979)
433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), cast doubt on the doctrine’s continued viability.
Questioned by Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt, 595 F. Supp. 125 (1984)
433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), adopting the minimum contacts test for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, casts considerable doubt on the continued vitality of the transient jurisdiction doctrine. 4 Wright and Miller § 1064, suppl. at 37; Bernstine,
Criticized by Kossoff v. Samsung Co., 123 Misc. 2d 177 (1984)
Shaffer (supra) has been criticized as being “premature and incomplete” in its consideration of a State’s interest in regulating corporations organized under its laws and of the contacts between the State and the corporations it charters (Measuring the Long Arm after Shaffer v Heitner, 53 NYU L Rev 126), and more than one commentator has concluded that the finding of insuf
Disagreed with by Anna I. Mason v. Anthony J. Mason (2010)
We disagree with Tony’s reading of Shaffer.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Dickstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 295 N.J. Super. 550 (1996)
The holding in Shaffer is inapposite to our analysis because the Court is not concerned with obtaining personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs, but is concerned with defining where plaintiffs' assets are located.
Distinguished by Field v. Evans, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 370 (1983)
” Consequently, any blurring Shaffer may have created in other instances is inapplicable to our present facts.
Distinguished by Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 496 (1978)
For the reasons below, we distinguish Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, and hold that the assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to Minn.St. 571.41, subd. 2, as limited by our earlier decision in Savchuk v. Rush, Minn., 245 N.W.2d 624
The opinion
Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring.
I agree that the principles of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), should be extended to govern assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction in a state court. I also agree that neither the statutory presence of appellants’ stock in Delaware nor their positions as directors and officers of a Delaware corporation can provide sufficient contacts to support the Delaware courts’ assertion of jurisdiction in this case.
I would explicitly reserve judgment, however, on whether the ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the value of the property. In the case of real property, in particular, preservation of the common-law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the uncertainty of the general International Shoe standard without significant cost to “ Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id., at 316 , quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940).
Subject to the foregoing reservation, I join the opinion of the Court.