holding that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) — no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) — if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration
How later courts described this case
- holding that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) — no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) — if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration
- stating that the determination of guilt or innocence in a criminal trial is "a decisive and portentous event" because "[s]ociety's resources have been concentrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens"
- holding that “contentions of federal law which were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due to respondent’s failure to raise them there as required by state procedure” also cannot be resolved on their merits in a federal habeas case—that is, they are “procedurally defaulted”
- stating that an attorney, “not the client, has the immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop” and “such decisions must, as a practical matter, be made without consulting the client.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
433 U.S. 72 (1977), and abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
Supreme Court of the United StatesSep 13, 199112 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itDeclined to follow by Edgar v. Trickey, 708 F. Supp. 1090 (1989)
We reject the Attorney General’s argument based on Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), and the progeny of that case that we should not consider the merits of the ground 3 claim.
Distinguished
Distinguished by George Arce v. Harold J. Smith, 889 F.2d 1271 (1989)
433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), and its progeny, is inapplicable because even if Arce defaulted under state law by failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on appeal, such a default is excused when the default results from the ineffectiveness of counsel on that appeal.
Distinguished by Eugene Rice v. Ronald C. Marshall, 816 F.2d 1126 (1987)
” See also Raper v. Mintzes, 706 F.2d 161, 163 (6th Cir.1983) (“In such a case, the rationale of Sykes is inapplicable since the state itself has chosen not to apply its procedural rules so as to bar the claim and the state has had the first opportunity to address the constitutional question.”); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933, 101 S.Ct. 1395, 67 L.Ed.2d 367 (1981)…
Distinguished by William Cohen v. Arthur Tate, Jr., 779 F.2d 1181 (1985)
433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), is also inapplicable.
Distinguished by Lorraine Meeks v. Donna Bergen, 749 F.2d 322 (1984)
Where a state appellate court did not rely on the procedural default, but reached the merits of a claim, the Sykes bar is inapplicable.
The opinion
MR. Justice White,
concurring in the judgment.
Under the Court’s cases a state conviction will survive challenge in federal habeas corpus not only when there has been a deliberate bypass within the meaning of Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), but also when the alleged constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt within the intendment of Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), and similar cases. The petition for habeas corpus of respondent Sykes alleging the violation of his constitutional rights by the admission of certain evidence should be denied if the alleged error is deemed harmless. This would be true even had there been proper objection to the evidence and no procedural default whatsoever by either respondent or his counsel. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371 (1972).
It is thus of some moment to me that the Court makes its own assessment of the record and itself declares that the evidence of guilt in this case is sufficient to “negate any possibility of actual prejudice resulting to the respondent from the *98 admission of his inculpatory statement.” Ante, at 91. This appears to be tantamount to a finding of harmless error under the Harrington standard and is itself sufficient to foreclose the writ and to warrant reversal of the judgment.
This would seem to obviate consideration of whether, in the light of Davis v. United States, 411 U. S. 233 (1973), and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), the deliberate-bypass rule of Fay v. Noia, supra, should be further modified with respect to those occasions during trial where the defendant does not comply with the contemporaneous-objection rule when evidence is offered but later seeks federal habeas corpus, claiming that admitting the evidence violated his constitutional rights. The Court nevertheless deals at length with this issue, and it is not inappropriate for me to add the following comments.
In terms of the necessity for Sykes to show prejudice, it seems to me that the harmless-error rule provides ample protection to the State’s interest. If a constitutional violation has been shown and there has been no deliberate bypass— at least as I understand that rule as applied to alleged trial lapses of defense counsel- — I see little if any warrant, having in mind the State’s burden of proof, not to insist upon a showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As long as there is acceptable cause for the defendant’s not objecting to the evidence, there should not be shifted to him the burden of proving specific prejudice to the satisfaction of the habeas corpus judge.
With respect to the necessity to show cause for noncompliance with the state rule, I think the deliberate-bypass rule of Fay v. Noia affords adequate protection to the State’s interest in insisting that defendants not flout the rules of evidence. The bypass rule, however, as applied to events occurring during trial, cannot always demand that the defendant himself concur in counsel’s judgment. Furthermore, if counsel is aware of the facts and the law (here the contemporaneous- *99 objection rule and the relevant constitutional objection that might be made) and yet decides not to object because he thinks the objection is unfounded, would damage his client’s case, or for any other reason that flows from his exercise of professional judgment, there has been, as I see it, a deliberate bypass. It will not later suffice to allege in federal habeas corpus that counsel was mistaken, unless it is “plain error” appearing on the record or unless the error is sufficiently egregious to demonstrate that the services of counsel were not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970). Other reasons not amounting to deliberate bypass, such as ignorance of the applicable rules, would be sufficient to excuse the failure to object to evidence offered during trial.
I do agree that it is the burden of the habeas corpus petitioner to negative deliberate bypass and explain his failure to object. Sykes did neither here, and I therefore concur in the judgment.