holding that a locked footlocker seized at the time of a defendant’s arrest could not be justified as a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control “if the ‘search is remote in time or place from the arrest’ ” or if the police have exclusive control of the property and “there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property” (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964))
How later courts described this case
- holding that a locked footlocker seized at the time of a defendant’s arrest could not be justified as a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control “if the ‘search is remote in time or place from the arrest’ ” or if the police have exclusive control of the property and “there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property” (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964))
- stating that once government agents seized a footlocker and transported the footlocker to a secure location, “there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained,” and, therefore, “it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant”
- recognizing the difficulty of explaining how such items as purses and briefcases should be analyzed under Chadwick and suggesting that Chadwick's holding might in the future be limited to "objects that are relatively immobile by virtue of their size or absence of a means of propulsion."
- finding that upon law enforcement officers’ removal of luggage or other personal property from person’s exclusive control, danger no longer exists that person “might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence,” and search of property not incident to arrest
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
433 U.S. 1, 11 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977) (holding “[b]y placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination”), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 , 114 L. Ed. 2d 619
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 3, 1991139 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itQuestioned by People v. Acevedo, 216 Cal. App. 3d 586 (1989)
Chadwick was inapplicable, determined the Supreme Court, because the customs officers “were unaware of the packages until they approached the trucks, and contraband might well have been hidden elsewhere in the vehicles . . . [T]he Customs officers had probable cause to believe that not only the packages but also the vehicles themselves contained contraband. . . . [¶
Limited — as noted by 3 later courts
We decline to apply the Chadwick rational proffered by the parties, however, because that decision has been abrogated and overruled by more recent Supreme Court cases.
3 citing opinions
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (2007)
433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) is inapplicable.
Distinguished by State v. Gamboa, 543 So. 2d 1129 (1989)
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) is inapposite to the situation at bar because in Chadwick the court held that a footlocker did not possess the requisite characteristics of mobility.
Distinguished by United States v. David Lee Grandstaff, Douglas Wayne Brown, 813 F.2d 1353 (1987)
433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), is inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. David Lee Grandstaff, Douglas Wayne Brown, 807 F.2d 851 (1987)
433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I fully join The Chief Justice’s thorough opinion for the Court. I write only to comment upon two points made by my Brother Blackmun’s dissent.
First, I agree wholeheartedly with my Brother Blackmun that it is “unfortunate” that the Government in this case “sought ... to vindicate an extreme view of the Fourth Amendment.” Post, at 17. It is unfortunate, in my view, not because this argument somehow “distract [ed]” the Court from other more meritorious arguments made by the Government — these arguments are addressed and convincingly rejected in the Court’s opinion — but because it is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by extreme and dubious legal arguments. It is gratifying that the Court today unanimously rejects the Government’s position.
Second, it should be noted that while Part II of the dissent suggests a number of possible alternative courses of action that the agents could have followed without violating the Constitution, no decision of this Court is cited to support the constitutionality of these courses, but only some decisions of Courts of Appeals. Post, at 23, nn. 4 and 5. In my view, it is not at all obvious that the agents could *17 legally have searched the footlocker had they seized it after Machado and Leary had driven away with it in their car 1 or “at the time and place of the arrests.” 2
While the contents of the car could have been searched pursuant to the automobile exception, it is by no means clear that the contents of locked containers found inside a car are subject to search under this exception, any more than they would be if the police found them in any other place.
When Machado and Leary were “standing next to [the] open automobile trunk containing the footlocker,” and even when they “were seated on it,” post, at 23, it is not obvious to me that the contents of the heavy, securely locked footlocker were within the area of their “immediate control” for purposes of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, the justification for which is the possibility that the arrested person might have immediate access to weapons that might endanger the officer’s safety or assist in his escape, or to items of evidence that he might conceal or destroy. I would think that the footlocker in this case hardly was “ ‘within [respondents’] immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which [they] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763 (1969).