concluding that post-crime procedural changes in death penalty sentencing — including one allowing the judge to overrule a jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment — were not ex post facto violations because they “merely altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishments attached to the crime.”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that post-crime procedural changes in death penalty sentencing — including one allowing the judge to overrule a jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment — were not ex post facto violations because they “merely altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishments attached to the crime.”
- holding that there was no ex post facto violation where the death penalty was invalidated after the defendant acted, because the subsequently invalidated statute’s “existence on the statute books provided fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State ascribed to the act . . . .”
- holding that when law violating the Illinois single subject rule was void ab initio, it was not an "operative fact" under Dobbert.
- holding that no Ex Post Facto violation occurs where a “statute simply alter[s] the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty [i]s to be imposed” and there is “no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532 (1983)
Whatever the merit of appellant’s claim and whatever the degree of speculative doubt Bullington cast on the continued viability of the approval in Proffitt and Dobbert of the practice now challenged, since this case was argued the Supreme Court has clearly reaffirmed its approval of the Florida procedure.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Jones v. State, 872 So. 2d 938 (2004)
The factual background in Dobbert clearly shows why the notice rationale is inapplicable to statutory reenactments of original legislation that have been found to be unconstitutional based on single-subject violations.
Distinguished by Green v. State, 839 So. 2d 748 (2003)
For all the reasons stated, Dobbert is inapplicable to this case.
Distinguished by People v. District Court, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1103 (1992)
Thomas relies on the fair warning test in Dobbert and argues that Dobbert is inapplicable because, contrary to Dobbert, prior to ■the time he allegedly committed the offenses in February 1991, he was on notice that Colorado’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional by virtue of our decisions in People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1990), and People v. O’Neill, 803 P.2d 164 (Colo.1990).
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. A crucial factor in this case, for me, is that, as the Court’s opinion recites, when petitioner committed the crime, a Florida statute permitted the death penalty for the offense. Petitioner was at least constructively on notice that this penalty might indeed follow his actions. During the time which elapsed between the commission of the offense and the trial, the statute was *304 changed to provide different procedures for determining whether death was an appropriate punishment. But these new procedures, taken as a whole, were, if anything, more favorable to the petitioner; consequently the change cannot be read otherwise than as the Court’s opinion suggests.