stating that “in order to be valid[,] [regulations] must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated” and holding that even though the agency’s interpretation of the relevant regulations governing military bonuses was reasonable, because the regulations were contrary to the purposes of Congress in enacting the bonus statute itself, the regulations were invalid
How later courts described this case
- stating that “in order to be valid[,] [regulations] must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated” and holding that even though the agency’s interpretation of the relevant regulations governing military bonuses was reasonable, because the regulations were contrary to the purposes of Congress in enacting the bonus statute itself, the regulations were invalid
- holding that a “ ‘soldier’s entitlement to pay is dependent upon statutory right,’ and that accordingly the rights of the affected service members must be determined by reference to the statutes and regulations[.]” (quoting Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 401, 81 S.Ct. 1230, 6 L.Ed.2d 365 (1961))
- concluding that the statute providing a reenlistment bonus for active duty soldiers, 37 U.S.C. § 308, was moneyrmandating, noting that “[t]he Court of Appeals opinion traces the history of this [reenlistment bonus] policy from 1795”
- holding that although regulations “contain[ed] a number of ambiguities,” Navy’s interpretation of Department of Defense regulations controlled since they were “not plainly inconsistent with wording of the regulations”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sebastain v. United States, 185 F.3d 1368 (1999)
See id. at 879-80, 97 S.Ct. 2150. Larionoff is distinguishable from the present case in a critical respect.
Distinguished by Ford v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 560 (1995)
Defendant insists that Larionoff is distinguishable because, in that case, the service members’ entitlement to bonuses vested at the time of their requests for retraining because they had obligated themselves to re-enlist or extend their enlistments if their requests were approved.
Distinguished by Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411 (1984)
Larionoff is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
Like the Court, I accept the Government’s interpretation of the relevant Navy Department regulations, but I do not agree *883 with the majority’s view that because Congress intended by the VRB legislation irrevocably to promise a re-enlistment bonus to those who agreed in advance to re-enlist the regulations are invalid. As I see it, the legislation was not part of the re-enlistment agreement, which was executed in consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits that would accrue during a continuance of the re-enlistee’s service. Those who executed re-enlistment agreements had no vested right in any particular level of pay, in any particular allowance or benefit, or in any particular total package of pay, allowances, or benefits. In this respect, I am in essential agreement with Judge Haynsworth’s opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Carini v. United States, 528 F. 2d 738 (1975), which concluded that cancellation of the VRB prior to the beginning of a re-enlistment period was not forbidden by law. I respectfully dissent.