finding unconstitutional a New York law provid *1064 ing that "an officer of a political party may be subpoenaed by a grand jury or other authorized tribunal and required to testify concerning his conduct of the party office he occupies,” and if he “refuses to answer any question, or if he declines to waive immunity from the use of his testimony against him in a later prosecution, the statute immediately terminates his party office and prohibits him from holding any other party or public office for a period of five years”
How later courts described this case
- finding unconstitutional a New York law provid *1064 ing that "an officer of a political party may be subpoenaed by a grand jury or other authorized tribunal and required to testify concerning his conduct of the party office he occupies,” and if he “refuses to answer any question, or if he declines to waive immunity from the use of his testimony against him in a later prosecution, the statute immediately terminates his party office and prohibits him from holding any other party or public office for a period of five years”
- finding unconstitutional a New York statute providing that if a political party officer who is subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his office refuses to testify or to waive immunity, his term of office will terminate; “when a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, the testimony is obtained in violation of the fifth amendment and cannot be used against the declarant in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”
- holding that New York could not strip a state Democratic party official of his office on the No. 03-4258 McKinley v. City of Mansfield, et al. Page 14 grounds that he refused to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before a grand jury
- finding unconstitutional a state statute providing that if a political party officer who is subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his office refused either to testify or to waive immunity, his term, of office will terminate
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. O'CONNOR, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 314 (1979)
431 U.S. 801 (1977), because the cases are distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part.
I join the Court’s judgment, for the reasons stated in Parts (1), (2), and (3) of its opinion. I cannot, however, join Part (4), because I continue to believe that “the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires that any jurisdiction that compels a man to incriminate himself grant him absolute immunity under its laws from prosecution for any transaction revealed in that testimony.” Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548, 562 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 462 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id., at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, even on the Court’s assumption that a lesser immunity is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, I question the propriety of the Court’s suggestion that the New York Legislature’s decision to grant *810 additional protection to the Fifth Amendment rights of grand jury witnesses was somehow contrary to the State’s best interests.