holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), a statute criminalizing possession “in interstate commerce or affecting commerce” of a firearm by a convicted felon, proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the required nexus between possession and commerce
How later courts described this case
- holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), a statute criminalizing possession “in interstate commerce or affecting commerce” of a firearm by a convicted felon, proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the required nexus between possession and commerce
- finding, with regard to an unrelated statute, that Congress need only require “the mini- mal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in inter- state commerce” for the statute to be within Congress’s Commerce Clause power
- concluding that, in the context of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, proof that a firearm traveled in interstate commerce satisfies the required nexus between possession of the firearm and commerce
- holding proof that possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and commerce
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled implicitly by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) — not on the Supreme Court's list
514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), implicitly overturned Scarborough.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Robert Wainwright v. United States, 470 F. App'x 281 (2012)
431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), was inapposite, and he contends that § 922(g) does not apply to possession of a firearm even if there is an interstate nexus.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting.
So far as the record reflects, the petitioner in this case acquired the four weapons in question before he was convicted of a felony in August 1972. Until that time, his possession of the guns was entirely legal under federal law. Under the Court’s construction of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a)(1), however, the petitioner was automatically guilty of a serious federal criminal offense at the moment he was convicted in the state felony case. This result is in my view inconsistent with the time-honored rule of lenity in construing federal criminal statutes. See, e. g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 ; Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 177-178 ; Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83 ; United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222 . I would hold that § 1202 (a)(1) does not come into play unless and until a person first comes into possession of a firearm after he is convicted of a felony.
The language of § 1202 (a)(1) does not compel the construction that the Court adopts. The statute covers “[a]ny person who . . . has been convicted ... of a felony . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports . . . any firearm . . . .” Plainly the acts of receiving and transporting are prohibited only if they occur after the defendant’s conviction. The language does not indicate, however, whether the illegal possession must also first begin after conviction, or whether a prior possession becomes illegal at the moment the possessor is adjudged guilty of a felony. ■ And, as the Court observes, ante, at 576-577, any reading of the statute makes *579 one or another part of it redundant. If § 1202 (a) makes criminal any postconviction possession of a gun by a convicted felon, then there will almost never be a situation where the Government would need to rely on the prohibition against receipt of the gun, for in most cases receipt would result in possession, and the latter is generally easier to prove. On the other hand, if the prohibition against possession refers to a possession that begins only after a felony conviction, the Government presumably could proceed on a receipt charge in such cases, without relying on the possession offense (or vice versa).
The legislative history does not provide much help. There are statements suggesting that Congress meant to proscribe any possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Other statements, however, intimate that the statute’s purpose was to prevent a convicted felon from coming into possession of a weapon after his conviction. For instance, Senator Long, the drafter and sponsor of § 1202, stated that the statute “places the burden and the punishment on the kind of people who have no business possessing firearms in the event they come into possession of them.” 114 Cong. Rec. 13869 (1968). Later he added that § 1202 (a) “would deny every assassin, murderer, thief and burglar . . . the right to possess a firearm in the future . . . .” 114 Cong. Rec. 14773.
In short, I disagree with the Court that the scope of § 1202 (a) is so crystal clear that there is no room for the operation of the rule of lenity. In my view, we are under no mandate to construe this statute so that a person in lawful possession of a firearm, and presumed to be innocent of a felony until proved guilty, must upon his conviction of a felony also be automatically and instantly guilty of a wholly different serious criminal offense. 1 The statute could equally *580 be read to apply only when a person first comes into possession of a firearm after his felony conviction. 2 That being so, I would choose the latter alternative, for “it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.” United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., supra, at 222.
Since the petitioner in this case came into possession of the firearms before he was convicted of any felony, I would hold that he did not violate § 1202 (a)(1). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court.
Under this construction, for example, a bookkeeper who owns a hunting rifle and who later commits embezzlement will, immediately upon his embezzlement conviction, also be guilty of violating § 1202 (a). At oral argument the Government agreed that such a person should have a reason *580 able time to relinquish possession without being automatically in violation of the statute, and suggested that prosecutorial discretion would take care of the problem. Proper construction of a criminal statute, however, cannot depend upon the good will of those who must enforce it.
Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, this reading would not allow a person “to go out in the period between his arrest and conviction and purchase and stockpile weapons with impunity.” Ante, at 576. Title 18 U. S. C. § 922 (h) makes it unlawful for any person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to receive any firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.