recognizing the legitimate governmental interest in eliminating the "free ride" problem in the context of public employee unions, and upholding Michigan's "agency shop" statute that required all public employees in a bargaining unit represented by a public employees' union to pay the union, as a condition of State employment, a fee equal to union dues
How later courts described this case
- recognizing the legitimate governmental interest in eliminating the "free ride" problem in the context of public employee unions, and upholding Michigan's "agency shop" statute that required all public employees in a bargaining unit represented by a public employees' union to pay the union, as a condition of State employment, a fee equal to union dues
- holding that requiring public employees, including non-union employees, to pay fees to defray the costs of collective bargaining activities is permissible except that no part thereof may be used in support of ideological causes
- holding that a union may not fund from mandatory fees political or ideological activities nongermane to its collective bargaining 18 CROWE V. OREGON STATE BAR duties
- holding that objecting non-members could not be compelled to pay agency fees for "the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to [the union's] duties as collective-bargaining representative"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees expressly overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.
Questioned by Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (1983)
While noting that Abood arguably cast doubt on the continuing validity of Arrington, the Third Circuit found Galda and Arrington readily distinguishable.
Questioned by Mooney v. Ill. Educ. Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 3d 690 (2019)
Nevertheless, in recent years the Supreme Court twice cast doubt on Abood 's continuing validity.
Criticized — as noted by 2 later courts
The Supreme Court concluded " Abood was wrongly decided" and refused to allow "unconstitutional exactions"-mandatory fair-share fees-"to continue indefinitely.
2 citing opinionsCriticized by Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employes, 466 U.S. 435 (1984)
431 U.S. 209, 234-35, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), criticized by Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees, 466 U.S. 435, 443, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984) (criticizing rebate program described in Abood).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Department of Education, 303 Conn. 402 (2012)
Abood is distinguishable from the present case, however, because the teachers were compelled to pay, as a condition of their employment, a service fee equal in amount to union dues even if the teacher was not a union member, and any teacher who failed to meet that obligation was subject to discharge.
Distinguished by Gallo Cattle Co. v. California Milk Advisory Board, 185 F.3d 969 (1999)
Gallo attempts to limit our inquiry to the single marketing order at issue in this case, arguing that because that single marketing order does not regulate the milk producers to the extent that the marketing order in Wileman regulated the tree fruit growers, Wile-man is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Florida Bar re Frankel, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 444 (1991)
To begin with, the California Supreme Court analogized its state bar association to a governmental agency and concluded that the first amendment restraints placed on the expenditure of compulsory union dues, as set forth in Abood, were inapplicable.
Distinguished by Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (1984)
In a case involving the use of student fees at a state university for purely political lobbying activities, we distinguished Abood as restricting only “that portion of the union service fee used for political or ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining____ [T]o the extent the service fee was used for purely political purposes, it could be extracted only from those employees who do not ob
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
Had I joined the plurality opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976), I would find it virtually impossible to join the Courtis opinion in this case. In Elrod , the plurality stated:
“The illuminating source to which we turn in performing the task [of constitutional adjudication] is the system *243 of government the First Amendment was intended to protect, a democratic system whose proper functioning is indispensably dependent on the unfettered judgment of each citizen on matters of political concern. Our decision in obedience to the guidance of that source does not outlaw political parties or political campaigning and management. Parties are free to exist and their concomitant activities are free to continue. We require only that the rights of every citizen to believe as he will and to act and associate according to his beliefs be free to continue as well.” Id., at 372 .
I do not read the Court’s opinion as leaving intact the “unfettered judgment of each citizen on matters of political concern” when it holds that Michigan may, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, require an objecting member of a public employees’ union to contribute to the funds necessary for the union to carry out its bargaining activities. Nor does the Court’s opinion leave such a member free “to believe as he will and to act and associate according to his beliefs.” I agree with the Court, and with the views expressed in Mr. Justice Powell’s opinion concurring in the judgment, that the positions taken by public employees’ unions in connection with their collective-bargaining activities inevitably touch upon political concern if the word “political” be taken in its normal meaning. Success in pursuit of a particular collective-bargaining goal will cause a public program or a public agency to be administered in one way; failure will result in its being administered in another way.
I continue to believe, however, that the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Elrod v. Burns, supra, which I joined, correctly stated the governing principles of First and Fourteenth Amendment law in the case of public employees such as this. I am unable to see a constitutional distinction between a governmentally imposed requirement that a public employee be a Democrat or Republican or else lose his job, *244 and a similar requirement that a public employee contribute to the collective-bargaining expenses of a labor union. I therefore join the opinion and judgment of the Court.