explaining that the question is “‘whether the ailing 13 instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 14 process’, . . . not merely whether ‘the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even 15 universally condemned’” (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the question is “‘whether the ailing 13 instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 14 process’, . . . not merely whether ‘the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even 15 universally condemned’” (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973))
- explaining that the question is “‘whether the ailing instruction 5 by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process’, . . . 6 not merely whether ‘the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally 7 condemned’” (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 , 146–47 (1973))
- holding that in considering a habeas claim based on an improper jury instruction, courts must ask “whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process, not merely whether the instruction is undesirable [or] erroneous” (quotations omitted)
- explaining that the inquiry is “not merely whether the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned” but “whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by TOUG HONG CHANG v. Minnesota, 521 F.3d 828 (2008)
431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977), which suggests that the plain-error Rule is inapplicable in a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254”).
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, but I find it unnecessary to resolve the question of New York criminal law considered by the Court, ante, at 155-157. In my view, the federal court was precluded from granting respondent’s petition for collateral relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 because he failed to object to the jury instructions at the time they were given. By that failure he waived any claim of constitutional error. This was precisely why the New York Court of Appeals refused to consider respondent’s belated claim. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443 (1965).
This Court has held that under certain circumstances a defendant’s failure to comply with state procedural requirements will not be deemed a waiver of federal constitutional rights, unless it is shown that such bypass was the result of a deliberate tactical decision. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972). These *158 cases, however, involved posi-trial omissions of a technical nature which would be unlikely to jeopardize substantial state interests. Midtrial omissions such as occurred in this case, on the other hand, are substantially different. “It is one thing to fail to utilize the [state] appeal process to cure a defect which already inheres in a judgment of conviction, but it is quite another to forgo making an objection or exception which might prevent the error from ever occurring.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 , 704 n. (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); * see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 513-514 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, by failing to object to the jury charge, respondent injected into the trial process the very type of error which the objection requirement was designed to avoid. Federal courts may not overlook such failure on collateral attack.
The “deliberate bypass” doctrine of Fay v. Noia, supra, should not be extended to midtrial procedural omissions which impair substantial state interests. I would simply hold that the United States District Court was barred from examining the substance of respondent’s constitutional claim, and rest our reversal of the Court of Appeals on that ground.
This is not a case such as Mullaney , where the State’s highest court ruled on the defendant’s claim even though he failed to raise the issue at trial. Rather, as the Court notes, ante, at 150, the New York Court of Appeals here expressly refused to rule on the adequacy of the charge because respondent failed to object in the trial court.