finding it unnecessary for Illinois to provide a preter-mination hearing in every case prior to suspending or revoking a driver’s license on the basis that the driver had committed certain vehicular offenses, and emphasizing "the important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard”
How later courts described this case
- finding it unnecessary for Illinois to provide a preter-mination hearing in every case prior to suspending or revoking a driver’s license on the basis that the driver had committed certain vehicular offenses, and emphasizing "the important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard”
- recognizing 30 E.g., Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113 (observing in a case that did not involve discrimination claims that “a licensee is not made entirely whole if his suspension or revocation is later vacated”). 24 a strong governmental interest “in [the] safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard”
- holding that a pre-seizure hearing would not have reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation since the discretionary revocation of the plaintiffs truck driver’s license was based on three prior convictions of speeding within a four-year period, and the plaintiff could not challenge the validity of the convictions
- holding that the risk of erroneous deprivation of a driver’s license was low when the suspension process was largely automatic and that an in-person hearing might make a driver feel better about being heard but would not actually contribute to protecting the driver’s rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by MacKey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)
In a second opinion issued October 6, 1977, the District Court reasoned that Love was distinguishable on several grounds and denied the Registrar’s motion to reconsider; the
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring in the result.
My Brother Stevens’ concurring opinion makes clear that appellee’s license was revoked under a valid regulation making *118 revocation mandatory if his license had been suspended three times within 10 years. Rule 6-206 (a) 3 (1975). Appellee’s license was properly suspended for a third time within a 10-year period when he was convicted of a speeding violation on March 31, 1976. This suspension, and both earlier suspensions, were based on convictions for traffic offenses which appellee does not contest here. Under these circumstances, the requirement of a prior hearing mandated by Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), is not applicable since, as my Brother Stevens demonstrates, a hearing was unnecessary to establish what was already clear — that the revocation of appellee’s license was mandatory.