holding “that the 15 fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 16 inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with 17 adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law”
How later courts described this case
- holding “that the 15 fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 16 inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with 17 adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law”
- holding “that the 14 fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 15 inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with 16 adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law”
- holding that “the fundamental constitutional right of 12 access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 13 meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate 14 assistance from persons trained in the law”
- holding “that the 16 fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 17 inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with 18 adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) — not on the Supreme Court's list
430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 24, 1996140 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported superseded by statute, as recognized in Joseph Brown v. Sage — not on the Supreme Court's list
430 U.S. 817 (1977), superseded by statute as stated in Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gary L. Jovanovich Frank R. Lapena v. Ron Angelone, 59 F.3d 175 (1995)
Appellants first claim that because their law library services functioned to fulfill the state's constitutional obligation to provide prisoners meaningful access to the courts, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828-29 (1977), the circumstances of their employment are distinguishable from other cases in which this court has characterized the inmate/prison work relationship as "penological, not pecuniary.
Distinguished by Ciccone v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 438 F. Supp. 55 (1977)
430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), relied on by plaintiff, is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
In view of the importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme, “ 'it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed.’ ” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 578 , quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483, 485 . From this basic principle the Court over five years ago made a quantum jump to the conclusion that a State has a constitutional obligation to provide law libraries for prisoners in its custody. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U. S. 15 .
Today the Court seeks to bridge the gap in analysis that made Gilmore’s authority questionable. Despite the Court’s valiant efforts, I find its reasoning unpersuasive.
If, as the Court says, there is a constitutional duty upon a State to provide its prisoners with “meaningful access” to the federal courts, that duty is not effectuated by adhering to the unexplained judgment in the Gilmore case. More than 20 years of experience with pro se habeas corpus petitions as a Member of this Court and as a Circuit Judge have convinced me that “meaningful access” to the federal courts can seldom be realistically advanced by the device of making law libraries available to prison inmates untutored in their use. In the vast majority of cases, access to a law library will, I am convinced, simply result in the filing of pleadings heavily larded with irrelevant legalisms—possessing the veneer but lacking the substance of professional competence.
If, on the other hand, Mr. Justice Rehnquist is correct in his belief that a convict in a state prison pursuant to a *837 final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction has no constitutional right of “meaningful access’' to the federal courts in order to attack his sentence, then a State can be under no constitutional duty to make that access “meaningful.” If the extent of the constitutional duty of a State is simply not to deny or obstruct a prisoner’s access to the courts, Johnson v. Avery, supra, then it cannot have, even arguably, any affirmative constitutional obligation to provide law libraries for its prison inmates.
I respectfully dissent.