holding that a New Hampshire statute requiring vehicles to bear license plates with the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” not obscured could not be constitutionally enforced because it violated the defendants’ First Amendment right “to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a New Hampshire statute requiring vehicles to bear license plates with the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” not obscured could not be constitutionally enforced because it violated the defendants’ First Amendment right “to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable”
- holding that a New Hampshire resident may cover up the state motto on their license plate because the state may not “constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public”
- holding that copyright owner has right to protect "the expressive content of his unpublished writings for the term of his copyright"
- holding that a state could not require a person to display the state motto on his or her license plate
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Cressman v. Thompson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (2012)
While the continuing validity of Wooley might be questioned for various reasons, including the proliferation of speciality license plates, the court is bound by the Supreme Court’s conclusion that standard license plates implicate private speech interests because of the connection of any message on the plate to the driver or owner of the vehicle.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 289 Or. App. 507 (2017)
In short, we reject the Kleins' analogy of this case to Barnette and Wooley .
Distinguished by State v. K.H.-H., 185 Wash. 2d 745 (2016)
Because of this, we find Wooley and Barnette are inapplicable in the present case, as they define the boundaries of free speech for those not convicted of crimes.
Distinguished by Uhlfelder v. Weinshall, 47 A.D.3d 169 (2007)
As the IAS court recognized, Wooley v Maynard (430 US 705 [1977]), upon which plaintiffs rely, is distinguishable.
Distinguished by American Family Prepaid Legal Corp. v. Columbus Bar Association, 498 F.3d 328 (2007)
705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), also cited by American Family, is distinguishable as it involved a state's interest in its license plate motto, not the regulation of law within its borders — an interest this circuit has recognized as "compelling.”
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join in part, dissenting in part.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), held that when state proceedings are not pending, but only threatened, a declaratory judgment may be entered with respect to the state statute at issue without regard to the strictures of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). But Steffel left *718 open whether an injunction should also issue in such circumstances. 415 U. S., at 463 . Then Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975), approved issuance by a federal court of a preliminary injunction against a threatened state prosecution, but only pending decision on the declaratory judgment and only then subject to “stringent” standards which should cause a district court to “weigh carefully the interests on both sides,” since prohibiting the enforcement of the State’s criminal law against the federal plaintiff, even pending final resolution of his case, “seriously impairs the State’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger.” Id., at 931 . Although finding the issuance of a preliminary injunction not an abuse of discretion in that case, the Court also distinguished between a preliminary injunction pendente lite and a permanent injunction at the successful conclusion of the federal case; for “a district court can generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine will be unnecessary.” Ibid.
Doran was thus true to the teachings of Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), where the Court held that an injunction against threatened state criminal prosecutions should not issue even though the underlying state statute had already been invalidated, relying on the established rule “that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions.” Id., at 163 . A threatened prosecution “even though alleged to be in violation of constitutional guaranties, is not a ground for equity relief . . . .” Ibid. An injunction should issue only upon a showing that the danger of irreparable injury is both “great and immediate,” citing the same authorities to this effect that this Court relied on in Younger v. Harris, supra. In each of the cited cases—and they do not exhaust the authorities to the same effect—criminal prosecutions were not pending when this Court ruled that a federal *719 equity court should not enter the injunction. “The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional. . . . To justify such interference there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of constitutional rights.” Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 95 (1935).
The Court has plainly departed from the teaching of these cases. The whole point of Douglas v. City of Jeannette’s admonition against injunctive relief was that once a declaratory judgment had issued, further equitable relief would depend on the existence of unusual circumstances thereafter. Here the State’s enforcement of its statute prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality by the federal court would appear to be no more than the performance of their duty by the State’s law enforcement officers. If doing this much prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality amounts to unusual circumstances sufficient to warrant an injunction, the standard is obviously seriously eroded.
Under our cases, therefore, more is required to be shown than the Court’s opinion reveals to affirm the issuance of the injunction. To that extent I dissent.