holding that the eighth amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment did not apply to the paddling of schoolchildren and rejecting the argument that compulsory education laws placed students in a position similar to that of incarcerated prisoners. The Court explained that prisoners and schoolchildren stand in “wholly different circumstances,” and that,“[t]hough attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the eighth amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment did not apply to the paddling of schoolchildren and rejecting the argument that compulsory education laws placed students in a position similar to that of incarcerated prisoners. The Court explained that prisoners and schoolchildren stand in “wholly different circumstances,” and that,“[t]hough attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution”
- holding the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause inapplicable to corporal punishment in public schools and observing that “[i]n the few cases where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable” (collecting cases)
- holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not apply to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials
- stating that “where a school official 8 acting under color of state law deliberately decides to punish a child for misconduct by restraining 9 the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain,” the student’s due process rights are implicated
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mahone Ex Rel. Mahone v. Ben Hill County School System, 377 F. App'x 913 (2010)
430 U.S. 651, 671, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (stating that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to cases where public school teachers impose corporal punishment).
Distinguished by Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966 (1982)
430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment was inapplicable to corporal punishment of school children; and instead analyzed said punishment from the viewpoint of the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal liberty.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Mr. Justice White’s analysis of the Eighth Amendment issue is, I believe, unanswerable. I am also persuaded that his analysis of the procedural due process issue is correct. Notwithstanding my disagreement with the Court’s holding *701 on the latter question, my respect for Mr. Justice Powell’s reasoning in Part IV-B of his opinion for the Court prompts these comments.
The constitutional prohibition of state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law does not, by its express language, require that a hearing be provided before any deprivation may occur. To be sure, the timing of the process may be a critical element in determining its adequacy—that is, in deciding what process is due in a particular context. Generally, adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard in advance of any deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest are essential. The Court has recognized, however, that the wording of the command that there shall be no deprivation “without” due process of law is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient. 1
When only an invasion of a property interest is involved, there is a greater likelihood that a damages award will make a person completely whole than when an invasion of the individual’s interest in freedom from bodily restraint and punishment has occurred. In the property context, therefore, frequently a postdeprivation state remedy may be all the process that the Fourteenth Amendment requires. It may also be true—although I do not express an opinion on the point—that an adequate state remedy for defamation may satisfy the due process requirement when a State has impaired an individual’s interest in his reputation. On that hypothesis, the Court’s analysis today gives rise to the thought that Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 , may have been correctly decided on an incorrect rationale. Perhaps the Court will one day *702 agree with Mr. Justice Brennan’s appraisal of the importance of the constitutional interest at stake in id., at 720-723, 734 (dissenting opinion), and nevertheless conclude that an adequate state remedy may prevent every state-inflicted injury to a person’s reputation from violating 42 U. S. C. § 1983 . 2
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 82, 90-92 ; Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U. S. 594, 598-600 ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 595-599 ; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 140-142 ; cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113-114 .
Cf. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311, 1318-1320 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976), cert. pending, No. 76-6204; see also Judge Swygert’s thoughtful opinion, id., at 569-578 .