holding that police discussion with defendant which mentioned the desirability of finding a murdered girl’s body so that it could be given a “Christian burial” violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel since the police acted with specific intent to exploit the defendant’s mental state since they knew he was recently released from a mental hospital, and had deeply held religious convictions
How later courts described this case
- holding that police discussion with defendant which mentioned the desirability of finding a murdered girl’s body so that it could be given a “Christian burial” violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel since the police acted with specific intent to exploit the defendant’s mental state since they knew he was recently released from a mental hospital, and had deeply held religious convictions
- concluding SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 OM 1947 A that because a defendant's self-representation motion involves the mutually exclusive constitutional rights to either be represented by counsel or not, a court must "indulge in every reasonable presumption against [a defendant's] waiver" of his right to counsel
- holding that defendant’s incriminating statements, made in response to the “Christian burial speech” by a police officer during a car ride, without presence of counsel, were inadmissible at trial because the officer “deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information” from the defendant
- stating that “[w]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned in part by Nollie Lee Martin v. Louie L. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (1985)
Although Williams may have cast doubt on the validity of Biddy’s conclusion that such a waiver may be inferred, see United States v. Brown, 569 F.2d 236, 246 n. 12 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), it did not call into question the portions of the Biddy opinion relied upon here.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Woods, 280 Ga. 758 (2006)
430 U. S. 387 (97 SC 1232, 51 LE2d 424) (1977), is clearly distinguishable.
Distinguished by Harger v. State, 665 P.2d 827 (1983)
Brewer, however, is readily distinguishable from the case at bar; the Supreme Court there held the confession to be involuntary due to the violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244 (1978)
We must also reject the suggestion that Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) is controlling in this case.
Distinguished by Ladd v. State, 1977 Alas. LEXIS 399 (1977)
Brewer, supra, is inapposite to the case at bar since it concerns the denial of sixth amendment rights under the rule of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964).
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his opinion for the Court which I join, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Marshall have *415 accurately explained the reasons why the law requires the result we reach today. Nevertheless, the strong language in the dissenting opinions prompts me to add this brief comment about the Court's function in a case such as this.
Nothing that we write, no matter how well reasoned or forcefully expressed, can bring back the victim of this tragedy or undo the consequences of the official neglect which led to the respondent's escape from a state mental institution. The emotional aspects of the case make it difficult to decide dispassionately, but do not qualify our obligation to apply the law with an eye to the future as well as with concern for the result in the particular case before us.
Underlying the surface issues in this case is the question whether a fugitive from justice can rely on his lawyer’s advice given in connection with a decision to surrender voluntarily. The defendant placed his trust in an experienced Iowa trial lawyer who in turn trusted the Iowa law enforcement authorities to honor a commitment made during negotiations which led to the apprehension of a potentially dangerous person. Under any analysis, this was a critical stage of the proceeding in which the participation of an independent professional was of vital importance to the accused and to society. At this stage—as in countless others in which the law profoundly affects the life of the individual—the lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual’s effective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer. *
The importance of this point is emphasized by the State’s refusal to permit counsel to accompany his client on the trip from Davenport to Des Moines.