stating that “five Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any other” and that “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “five Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any other” and that “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.”
- holding only that “the record on appeal [must] disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which motivated the death sentence,” but it does not require that the trial court identify the precise mitigating factors it weighed
- holding that the sentencing process “must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause” and that a criminal defendant “has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence”
- holding that a capital defendant’s due process rights were violated because he was sentenced without being provided access to information relevant to the trial court’s sentencing decision
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986)
While we consider it both prudent and equitably incumbent upon the judge to make such disclosures, we decline to apply Gardner so broadly as to mandate it as a matter of constitutional necessity in this case.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Smith v. State, 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 26 (1995)
While we believe Simmons is distinguishable based upon this fact alone, we also believe the underlying rationale for the Supreme Court in Simmons based upon Gardner, supra, is inapplicable to Texas jurisprudence.
Distinguished by Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501 (1988)
Gardner, therefore, is inapposite to the case at bar.
Distinguished by State v. Paaaina, 67 Haw. 408 (1984)
Gardner is distinguishable on two bases.
Distinguished by Alpha Otis O'Daniel Stephens v. Walter Zant, Superintendent, 631 F.2d 397 (1980)
For the reasons set out below, we hold that Gardner is not controlling here and that petitioner’s sentence should not be overturned on this ground.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring in the judgment.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976), the Court addressed the question whether the mandatory death penalty imposed under the statute involved in that case was *363 consistent with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The plurality opinion stated:
“The issue, like that explored in Furman, involves the procedure employed by the State to select persons for the unique and irreversible penalty of death.” Id., at 287 . (Emphasis added.)
In holding that the failure to conduct the sort of post-trial sentencing proceeding which Florida law requires, and which was conducted in this case, rendered North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional, the plurality said:
“[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. [86,] 100 (plurality opinion), requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
“This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Id., at 304-305. (Emphasis added.)
The issue in this case, like the issue in Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, “involves the procedure” employed by the State in selecting persons who will receive the death penalty. Here the sentencing judge indicated that he selected petitioner Gardner for the death penalty in part because of information contained in a presentence report which information was not *364 disclosed to petitioner or to his counsel and to which petitioner had no opportunity to respond. A procedure for selecting people for the death penalty which permits consideration of such secret information relevant to the “character and record of the individual offender,” id., at 304 , fails to meet the “need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment” which the Court indicated was required in Woodson, supra, at 305 . This conclusion stems solely from the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments on which the Woodson decision expressly rested, and my conclusion is limited, as was Woodson , to cases in which the death penalty is imposed. I thus see no reason to address in this case the possible application to sentencing proceedings—in death or other cases—of the Due Process Clause, other than as the vehicle by which the strictures of the Eighth Amendment are triggered in this case. For these reasons, I do not join the plurality opinion but concur in the judgment.