holding that even if the plaintiff police officer would ordinarily have been entitled to a pre-termination hearing under the Due Process Clause, he was not entitled to such a hearing where he did not dispute the truth of the charges against him, because the purpose of a hearing is to resolve disputed factual issues
How later courts described this case
- holding that even if the plaintiff police officer would ordinarily have been entitled to a pre-termination hearing under the Due Process Clause, he was not entitled to such a hearing where he did not dispute the truth of the charges against him, because the purpose of a hearing is to resolve disputed factual issues
- holding that former police officer failed to affirmatively assert “that the report of the apparent suicide attempt was substantially false” and, as a result, failed to satisfy the final necessary element needed to make out a claim of stigmatization
- holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing with respect to derogatory statements about him because "[n]owhere in his pleadings or elsewhere has [he] affirmatively asserted that the [statements in issue were] substantially false"
- holding that a name-clearing hearing, ordinarily required for an employee stigmatized by discharge, is not required where the employee "does not challenge the substantial truth of the material in question"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mathews v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, 91 F. Supp. 3d 989 (2015)
Plaintiff argues that Codd is inapplicable to the facts of this case because plaintiff “was not afforded any forum in which to dispute his claim.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting.
Although sharing generally the views expressed in the Court’s opinion, I agree with Part III of Mr. Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, and I would for that reason remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.