explaining that “[i]f petitioner was [the delinquent taxpayer’s] alter ego,” it would “then follow that the Service could properly regard petitioner’s assets as [the delinquent taxpayer’s] property subject to the lien under § 6321, and the Service would be empowered, under § 6331, to levy upon assets held in petitioner’s name in satisfaction of [the delinquent taxpayer’s] income tax liability.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[i]f petitioner was [the delinquent taxpayer’s] alter ego,” it would “then follow that the Service could properly regard petitioner’s assets as [the delinquent taxpayer’s] property subject to the lien under § 6321, and the Service would be empowered, under § 6331, to levy upon assets held in petitioner’s name in satisfaction of [the delinquent taxpayer’s] income tax liability.”
- explaining that although “a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context[,]” a corporation’s premises is protected by corporation’s Fourth Amendment rights
- holding that IRS agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized taxpayer property during a warrantless search and remanding for a determination of whether the plaintiffs Bivens action should be dismissed because the IRS agents acted in good faith
- concluding that the government's nonconsen-sual search of a business office and seizure of furnishings, books, and records contained therein was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment absent a warrant or exigent circumstances
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
While I concur in the opinion of the Court, it may be useful to note that the factual setting of this case provides what seems, to me, a classic illustration of the dividing line between an impermissible, warrantless entry and one permissible under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
After their initial entry into, and retreat from, the petitioner’s office-cottage, the IRS agents assigned to the investigation of the fugitive Norman’s tax liability placed the premises under 24-hour surveillance. One night during the course of this surveillance, the agents observed cartons and other materials being removed from the premises by persons unknown to them. Against the background facts, such surreptitious nighttime activity constituted an exigent circumstance that would have justified an immediate seizure of the materials being moved in order to protect the interests of the United States. This is especially so since here the premises were controlled by the alter ego of an individual who was not only a delinquent taxpayer, but who was, at the time, a fugitive from justice. Rather than acting immediately, however, the agents chose to wait for approximately a day and a half to two days before making their entry. I agree with the conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances on these facts; however, the Court holds no more than that the agents’ delay after observing these highly suspicious events makes that exception • to the warrant requirement unavailable to them. By failing to act at once, the exigency was dissipated, and I do not understand our *362 opinion to imply, in any way, that the removal of cartons, which could reasonably have contained relevant records needed by the Government, would not have been an exigent circumstance permitting immediate seizure without the warrant required by the Fourth Amendment.