explaining that inference of intentional discrimination may arise from circumstances such as the “historical background of the decision, ... particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes, ... [the] specific sequence of events leading up the challenged decision, ... [departures from the normal procedural sequence, [and sjubstantive departures ..., particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that inference of intentional discrimination may arise from circumstances such as the “historical background of the decision, ... particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes, ... [the] specific sequence of events leading up the challenged decision, ... [departures from the normal procedural sequence, [and sjubstantive departures ..., particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached”
- explaining that discriminatory intent can be established through a pattern of racially-discriminatory impact "unexplainable on grounds other than race,” departures from normal procedures, "contemporary statements by members of the de-cisionmaking body,” or a suspicious "sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,” such as when a property that had always been zoned to allow housing was only rezoned when the town learned of plans to make the housing integrated
- finding standing when "it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Unless rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally attractive price."
- finding standing even though the requested relief removed only one barrier — zoning requirements — from construction of a housing development because the remaining barriers — such as financing — were mere "uncertainties” rather than “absolute barriers,” which permitted the court to infer a “substantial probability” that the housing would be built if the zoning requirements were invalidated
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Chapman v. Nicholson, 579 F. Supp. 1504 (1984)
429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), cast doubt on
Distinguished
Distinguished by Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. City of Snoqualmie, 186 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (2016)
) Defendants argue that the standard for Section 1981 claims—intentional racial discrimination—is different and thus the Arlington Heights factors are inapplicable.
Distinguished by Hope, Inc., an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, Plaintiffs v. The County of Dupage, Illinois, 738 F.2d 797 (1984)
Thus, the facts in Arlington Heights are clearly distinguishable from the present case since there have been no concrete allegations or proof that any proposed housing project, into which the plaintiffs intended to and would probably move, was in fact denied special use permits or zoning variances.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Parts I-III of the Court’s opinion. However, I believe the proper result would be to remand this entire case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and today’s opinion. The Court of Appeals is better situated *272 than this Court both to reassess the significance of the evidence developed below in light of the standards we have set forth and to determine whether the interests of justice require further District Court proceedings directed toward those standards.