General Electric Co. v. Gilbert · 429 U.S. 125

stating that courts may give less weight to guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of law or to regulations which, under the enabling statute, may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability

How later courts described this case

stating that courts may give less weight to guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of law or to regulations which, under the enabling statute, may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability
holding that a similar benefits exclusion for pregnancy-related disability did not violate Title VII and reiterating that “exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all”
concluding that pregnancy discrimination does not in itself constitute sex discrimination while interpreting Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, which at the time included language very similar to Florida’s current statute
holding that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the insurance plan did not violate Title VII even though the exclusion impacted one gender more than the other

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement v. Johnson Controls, Inc. — not on the Supreme Court's list
429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 219
Supreme Court of the United StatesMar 20, 19912 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Criticized by Lavalley v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 166 Vt. 205 (1997)
The Gilbert decision has been roundly criticized.
Supreme Court of VermontJan 17, 1997Read it

The opinion

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

concurring in part.

I join the judgment of the Court and concur in its opinion insofar as it holds (a) that General Electric’s exclusion of disability due to pregnancy is not, per se, a violation of § 703 (a)(1) of Title VII; (b) that the plaintiffs in this case therefore had at least the burden of proving discriminatory effect; and (c) that they failed in that proof. I do not join any inference or suggestion in the Court’s opinion — if any such inference or suggestion is there — that effect may never be a controlling factor in a Title VII case, or that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), is no longer good law.