holding that Fla. Stat. ง 921.141(6) (1981), which lists mitigating circumstances, does not restrict the sentencer's consideration of mitigating circumstances to those expressly listed in the statute
How later courts described this case
- holding that Fla. Stat. ง 921.141(6) (1981), which lists mitigating circumstances, does not restrict the sentencer's consideration of mitigating circumstances to those expressly listed in the statute
- stating that the Florida Supreme Court had imposed a constitutional construction on Florida’s “heinousness” aggravating factor by limiting it to the “ ‘conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim’ ” (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973))
- holding argument that “the prosecutor’s decision whether to charge a capital offense in the first place” rendered Florida’s death penalty unconstitutional represented “a fundamental misinterpretation” of Supreme Court precedent and rejecting such argument
- holding that a scheme which required the sentencer to determine whether mitigating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh aggravating circumstances adequately guided and channeled the sentencer's discretion
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532 (1983)
Whatever the merit of appellant’s claim and whatever the degree of speculative doubt Bullington cast on the continued viability of the approval in Proffitt and Dobbert of the practice now challenged, since this case was argued the Supreme Court has clearly reaffirmed its approval of the Florida procedure.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 405-414 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and id., at 375, 414 , and 465.