holding that primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply because "[t]he standards to be applied in [the] action . . . are within the conventional competence of the courts, and the judgment of a technically expert body is not likely to be helpful in the application of these standards to the facts of the case"
How later courts described this case
- holding that primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply because "[t]he standards to be applied in [the] action . . . are within the conventional competence of the courts, and the judgment of a technically expert body is not likely to be helpful in the application of these standards to the facts of the case"
- explaining that even when common law rights and remedies survive, and the agency lacks power to determine common law liability, it may be appropriate to refer specific issues to an agency for initial determination where doing so would advance the policies behind the primary jurisdiction doctrine
- holding that a common-law claim for fraudulent representation based on overbooking practices could proceed because it was not “absolutely inconsistent” with the FAA and could “coexist as contemplated by § 1106”
- holding that any impact on rates that may result from the imposition of common law tort liability or from practices adopted by a carrier to avoid such liability would be incidental
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with these additional words.
It may be that under its rulemaking authority the Board would have power to order airline overbooking and to pre-empt recoveries under state law for undisclosed overbooking or for overselling. But it has not done so, at least as yet. It is also unnecessary to stay proceedings on the present state-law claim pending Board action under § 411. Neither an order denying nor one granting relief under that section would foreclose claims based on state law; and there is not present here the additional consideration that a § 411 proceeding would be helpful in resolving, or affecting in some manner, the state-law claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Cf. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U. S. 289 (1973); Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deak *309 tor, 414 U. S. 113 (1973). I seriously doubt that any pending or future § 411 case would reveal anything relevant to this case about the Board's view of the propriety of overbooking and of overselling that is not already apparent from prior proceedings concerning those subjects.