holding that, "[e]ven accepting the appellate court's conclusion that the trial judge overreacted in expelling [defense counsel] from the court-room," where the appellate court "did not suggest, the respondent has not contended, and the record does not show that the judge's action was motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice the respondent," double jeopardy did not attach
How later courts described this case
- holding that, "[e]ven accepting the appellate court's conclusion that the trial judge overreacted in expelling [defense counsel] from the court-room," where the appellate court "did not suggest, the respondent has not contended, and the record does not show that the judge's action was motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice the respondent," double jeopardy did not attach
- reasoning that absent a defense motion, if mistrial is needed for "prosecutorial or judicial error," the "doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings"
- holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrials where bad-faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor threatens to harass a defendant by means of successive prosecutions or a declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict
- stating that, where a judicial or prosecutorial error warranting mistrial occurs, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled by Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) — not on the Supreme Court's list
When Kennedy's holding is compared with Dinitz's, it is apparent that Kennedy overruled Dinitz, for Kennedy reduced the bases upon which a defendant, after moving for a mistrial, could plead double jeopardy from the two provided by Dinitz to only one.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs, dissenting.
The Court’s premise is that the mistrial was directed at respondent’s request or with his consent. I agree with the Court of Appeals that, for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, it was not, but rather that “the trial judge’s response to the conduct of defense counsel deprived Dinitz’s motion for a mistrial of its necessary consensual character.” 492 F. 2d 53 , 59 n. 9 (1974). Therefore the rule that “a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution,” United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 485 (1971) (plurality opinion), is inapplicable. Accordingly, I agree that respondent’s motion, for the reasons expressed in the panel and en banc opinions of the Court of Appeals, did not remove the bar of double jeopardy to reprosecution in “the extraordinary circumstances of the present case, in which judicial error alone, rather than [respondent’s] exercise of any option to stop or go forward, took away his ‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.’ ” 504 F. 2d 854 -855 (1974). I also agree with the holding in the panel opinion that “[i]n view of . . . [the] alternatives which would not affect the ability to continue the trial, we cannot say that there was manifest necessity for the trial judge’s actions.” 492 F. 2d., at 61. I would affirm.