holding that enforcement of arbitration decisions where arbitrator has erred "is conditioned upon the union’s having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connection with the arbitration proceedings”
How later courts described this case
- holding that enforcement of arbitration decisions where arbitrator has erred "is conditioned upon the union’s having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connection with the arbitration proceedings”
- holding that a plaintiff may only obtain judicial relief by demonstrating that the union breached its duty to represent her fairly and that the company breached the collective bargaining agreement
- noting that “breach of the duty of fair representation is not established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious”
- holding unless plaintiff can prove breach of union’s duty of fair representation, “finality” rule of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965) precludes relit-igation of plaintiffs grievance
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Brown v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 247 (1983)
case, on which plaintiff most seriously relies (424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976)) is readily distinguishable.
The opinion
Me. Justice Stewakt,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that proof of breach of the Union’s duty of fair representation will remove the bar of finality from the arbitral decision that Anchor did not wrongfully discharge the petitioners. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 194 ; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 348-351 . But this is not to say that proof of breach of the Union’s representation duty would render Anchor potentially liable for backpay accruing between the time of the “tainted” decision by the arbitration committee *573 and a subsequent “untainted” determination that the discharges were, after all, wrongful.
If an employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitral decision, then his failure to reinstate discharged employees cannot be anything but rightful, until there is a contrary determination. Liability for the intervening wage loss must fall not on the employer but on the union. Such an apportionment of damages is mandated by Vaca’s holding that “damages attributable solely to the employer’s breach of contract should not be charged to the union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the union’s refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the employer.” 386 U. S., at 197-198 . To hold an employer liable for back wages for the period during which he rightfully refuses to rehire discharged employees would be to charge him with a contractual violation on the basis of conduct precisely in accord with the dictates of the collective agreement.