holding that the “specific dictates of due process” must be determined by weighing (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2
How later courts described this case
- holding that the “specific dictates of due process” must be determined by weighing (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2
- holding that court review of due process challenges require consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the public interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
- holding that no evidentiary hearing is required prior to the termination of social security benefits and stating that the factors to be considered when determining what process is due are (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the fiscal and administrative burdens that any additional procedural requirements would impose
- finding 6 that "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest . . ."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Criticized by City of Dayton v. Rutledge, 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 14 (1983)
I note that the present Supreme Court’s approach to procedural due process issues, as elaborated in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, has been criticized as too instrumental, too concerned with the reliability of the result, and too little concerned with the philosophical basis of procedural due process: the right of the individual to be treated as a person by the decision maker.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (2019)
The Court is aware of only one § 1225(b) case that applied the Mathews factors, and that case is distinguishable from the instant action because the petitioner had already received, prior to Jennings , a Rodriguez III bond hearing and was seeking a second hearing.
Distinguished by Aurora Chi. Lakeshore Hosp. v. Azar, 356 F. Supp. 3d 749 (2018)
Although it is true that in Sunrise Healthcare Corp. v. Shalala , 50 F.Supp.2d 830 (S.D. Ill. 1999) the Southern District of Illinois subsequently applied Ancillary to a post-termination challenge under the Medicare Act asserting jurisdiction under Eldridge , that case was distinguishable because it was premised on a challenge to the Secretary's statutory authority to terminate absent a finding of immediate jeopardy,…
Distinguished by People v. Sanchez, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 139 (2017)
The People argue that Mathews is inapplicable to the instant case.
Distinguished by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Silkman, 233 F. Supp. 3d 201 (2017)
Additionally, FERC argues that the three-factor test from Mathews is inapposite because the Respondents had the opportunity “to present evidence, wit
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U. S. 208, 212 (1972), I agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that, prior to termination of benefits, Eldridge must be af *350 forded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seg. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). I would add that the Court’s consideration that a discontinuance of disability benefits may cause the recipient to suffer only a limited deprivation is no argument. It is speculative. Moreover, the very legislative determination to provide disability benfits, without any prerequisite determination of need in fact, presumes a need by the recipient which is not this Court’s function to denigrate. Indeed, in the present case, it is indicated that because disability benefits were terminated there was a foreclosure upon the Eldridge home and the family’s furniture was repossessed, forcing Eldridge, his wife, and their children to sleep in one bed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, 47-48. Finally, it is also no argument that a worker, who has been placed in the untenable position of having been denied disability benefits, may still seek other forms of public assistance.