explaining that a statute is not void for vagueness even when a legislature “might, without difficulty, have chosen clearer and more precise language equally capable of achieving the end which it sought” (cleaned up)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a statute is not void for vagueness even when a legislature “might, without difficulty, have chosen clearer and more precise language equally capable of achieving the end which it sought” (cleaned up)
- noting that just because Congress “may have chosen clearer and more precise language equally capable of achieving the end which it sought does not mean that the statute which it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague.”
- recognizing that vagueness challenges not involving the First Amendment must be reviewed based on the facts of the case
- observing that the fact that a more precise statute could be crafted does not mean the statute that was enacted is 4 STATE v. HERNANDEZ Opinion of the Court unconstitutionally vague
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the statutory provision before us is not unconstitutionally vague, because I think the provision has an objectively measurable meaning under established principles of statutory construction. Specifically, I think the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable here, and that 18 U. S. C. § 1715 must thus be read specifically to make criminal the mailing of a pistol or revolver, or of any firearm as “capable of being concealed on the person” as a pistol or revolver.
The rule of ejusdem generis is applicable in a setting such as this unless its application would defeat the intention of Congress or render the general statutory language meaningless. See United States v. Alpers, 338 *95 U. S. 680, 682 ; United States v. Salen, 235 U. S. 237, 249-251 ; United States v. Stever, 222 U. S. 167, 174-175 . Application of the rule in the present situation entails neither of those results. Instead of draining meaning from the general language of the statute, an ejusdem generis construction gives to that language an ascertainable and intelligible content. And, instead of defeating the intention of Congress, an ejusdem generis construction coincides with the legislative intent.
The legislative history of the bill on which § 1715 was based contains persuasive indications that it was not intended to apply to firearms larger than the largest pistols or revolvers. Representative Miller, the bill’s author, made it clear that the legislative concern was not with the “shotgun, the rifle, or any firearm used in hunting or by the sportsman.” 66 Cong. Rec. 727. As a supporter of the legislation stated: “The purpose ... is to prevent the shipment of pistols and revolvers through the mails.” 67 Cong. Rec. 12041. The only reference to sawed-off shotguns came in a question posed by Representative McKeown: “Is there anything in this bill that will prevent the citizens of Oklahoma from buying sawed-off shotguns to defend themselves against these bank-robbing bandits?” Representative Blanton, an opponent of the bill, responded: “That may come next. Sometimes a revolver is more necessary than a sawed-off shotgun.” 66 Cong. Rec. 729. In the absence of more concrete indicia of legislative intent, the pregnant silence that followed Representative Blanton’s response can surely be taken as an indication that Congress intended the law to reach only weapons of the same general size as pistols and revolvers.
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with these views.