holding that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to challenge the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds
How later courts described this case
- holding that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to challenge the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds
- holding that defendant, by pleading guilty, did not waive a double jeopardy claim because, were the claim well founded, the government could “not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt [might be] established”
- holding that a counseled plea of guilty does not constitute an implied waiver of a claim based upon the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution
- holding that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on its 17 face the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Taylor v. State, 381 Md. 602 (2004)
423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975), is also distinguishable.
Distinguished by People v. Eaton, 184 Mich. App. 649 (1990)
Menna is inapplicable. [Emphasis added.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan
agrees that “[w]here the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty,” ante, at 62, but on his view that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution from mounting successive prosecutions for offenses growing out of the same criminal transaction, he believes that the proper disposition of the case is not a remand but outright reversal. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Chiee Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.