stating that “[t]he principle underlying Younger and Samuels [v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688] is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional claims, and, therefore, a federal court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding. In absence of such a proceeding, however, as we recognized in Steffel [v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) ], a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of the state statute in federal court, assuming he can satisfy the requirements for federal jurisdiction.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[t]he principle underlying Younger and Samuels [v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688] is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional claims, and, therefore, a federal court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding. In absence of such a proceeding, however, as we recognized in Steffel [v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) ], a plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of the state statute in federal court, assuming he can satisfy the requirements for federal jurisdiction.”
- holding that “[although the customary “barroom” type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances.”
- stating that "[a]lthough customary 'barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances."
- stating that at the conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state statute or local ordinance, a district court can “generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment,” thereby rendering the extraordinary relief afforded by an injunction unnecessary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Me. Justice Douglas,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
While adhering to my position in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 58 (1971) (dissenting opinion), I join the judgment of the Court insofar as it holds that Salem Inn and Tim-Rob were entitled to a preliminary injunction pending disposition of their request for declaratory relief. I do not condone the conduct of M & L in violating the challenged ordinance without awaiting judicial action on its federal complaint, but like the Court of Appeals, I find no compelling reason to distinguish M & L from the other respondents in terms of the relief which is appropriate. I would therefore affirm the judgment below in all respects.