holding that the constitutionality of a checkpoint stems, in part, from the fact that “[a]t traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion,” thus offering greater protection to drivers’ “liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the constitutionality of a checkpoint stems, in part, from the fact that “[a]t traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion,” thus offering greater protection to drivers’ “liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials.”
- finding that a search is a "substantial invasion of privacy" and, therefore, to protect individual's right to be free from "official arbitrariness," those effectuating the search must have probable cause
- holding Fourth Amendment violated if seizure occurred and force used to effect the seizure was unreasonable
- explaining that suspects’ statements were “central to ... consideration of whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the Plaintiffs had” committed a crime
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
I joined the dissent of my Brother White in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), and recognize that the present decision is an extension of the unsound rule announced in that case. I nonetheless join the opinion of the Court, because a majority of the Court still adheres to Almeida-Sanchez and because I agree with the Court’s analysis of the significance of the Government’s proffered distinctions between roving and fixed-checkpoint searches.
I wish to stress, however, that the Court’s opinion is confined to full searches, and does not extend to fixed-checkpoint stops for the purpose of inquiring about citizenship. Such stops involve only a modest intrusion, are not likely to be frightening or significantly annoying, are regularized by the fixed situs, and effectively serve the important national interest in controlling illegal *899 entry. I do not regard such stops as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether or not accompanied by “reasonable suspicion” that a particular vehicle is involved in immigration violations, cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873, and I do not understand today’s opinion to cast doubt upon their constitutionality.