holding that although roving patrols in which officers stop and question motorists about their resident status may be conducted without probable cause, such stops must, at least, show that the "stopping officer is `aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion' that a vehicle contains illegal aliens who may be illegally in the country."
How later courts described this case
- holding that although roving patrols in which officers stop and question motorists about their resident status may be conducted without probable cause, such stops must, at least, show that the "stopping officer is `aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion' that a vehicle contains illegal aliens who may be illegally in the country."
- holding that when a border patrol officer’s observations lead him or her to reasonably suspect that a vehicle may contain illegal aliens, the officer may stop the vehicle, question its occupants as to citizenship and immigration status, and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but stating that any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause
- concluding that Border Patrol agents on 25 roving patrols may perform reasonable Terry-stops and “question the driver and passengers 26 about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious 27 circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable 28 cause.”
- holding that under the Fourth Amendment law enforcement officers may, when based upon reasonable suspicion, “question [an individual] about their citizenship and immigration status, and [] may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Cortez Avery, 128 F.3d 974 (1997)
Thus, although the Court in Brignoni-Ponce stated “the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor,” we refuse to adopt, by analogy, the concept that “the likelihood that any given person of African ancestry is involved in drug trafficking is high enough to make African ancestry a relevant fact” in investigating drug tr
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court. I think it quite important to point out, however, that that opinion, which is joined by a somewhat different majority than that which comprised the Almeida-Sanchez Court, is both by its terms and by its reasoning concerned only with the type of stop involved in this case. I think that just as travelers entering the country may be stopped and searched without probable cause and without founded suspicion, because of “national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in,” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925), a strong case may be made for those charged with the enforcement of laws conditioning the right of vehicular use of a highway to likewise stop motorists using highways in order to determine whether they have met the qualifications prescribed by applicable law for such use. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 440-441 (1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972). I regard these and similar situations, such *888 as agricultural inspections and highway roadblocks to apprehend known fugitives, as not in any way constitutionally suspect by reason of today’s decision.