determining that the requirement of administrative exhaustion would be met if “the Secretary [of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different section of the Act”
How later courts described this case
- determining that the requirement of administrative exhaustion would be met if “the Secretary [of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different section of the Act”
- stating that “[ejxhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have the opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review”
- stating that “[e]xhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have the opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review”
- finding court divested of jurisdiction only when statute explaining exhaustion of administrative remedies contained “sweeping and direct” statutory language that went beyond a requirement of administrative exhaustion; in Weinberger the statute at issue was “sweeping and direct” as it instructed claims at issue could not be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Buckner v. Maher, 424 F. Supp. 366 (1976)
422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.), the Court cast doubt on the validity of the doctrine of irrebuttable presumption.
Distinguished
Distinguished by In Re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, 509 F.3d 116 (2007)
Well-Made Toy, Morris, and Weinberger Are Distinguishable
Distinguished by Mikuriya v. Leavitt, 248 F. App'x 818 (2007)
As such, he certainly did not ‘‘present[] his ... claim at a sufficiently high level of review to satisfy the Secretary's administrative needs,” Klein, 761 F.2d at 1312 (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765-66, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975)), so Klein is inapposite even on its own terms.
Distinguished by Jenkins v. Department of Social & Health Services, 160 Wash. 2d 287 (2007)
Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 784-85. ¶27 Weinberger is distinguishable because the present case does not deal with individuals who are attempting to qualify for federal benefits; rather, the individuals here are already eligible recipients of Medicaid.
Distinguished by Jenkins v. DSHS, 157 P.3d 388 (2007)
Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 784-85, 95 S.Ct. 2457. ¶ 27 Weinberger is distinguishable because the present case does not deal with individuals who are attempting to qualify for federal benefits; rather, the individuals here are already eligible recipients of Medicaid.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I agree with Mr. Justice Brennan that because there is clearly jurisdiction the Court's extended discussion of the subject is unwarranted.
On the merits, I believe that the main problem with these legislatively created presumptions is that they frequently invade the right to a jury trial. See Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 473 (1943) (Black, J., concurring). The present law was designed to bar payment of certain Social Security benefits when the purpose of the marriage was to obtain such benefits. Whether this was the aim of a particular marriage is a question of fact, to be decided by the jury in an appropriate case. I therefore would vacate and remand the case to give Mrs. Salfi the right to show that her *786 marriage did not offend the statutory scheme, that it was not a sham.